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Abstract 
 
Aviation mishaps are extremely costly in terms of dollar value, public opinion, 
and human life.  The Air Force drastically reduced Class A mishap rates in its formative 
years.  The rate plummeted from 44.22 mishaps per 100,000 flight hours in 1947 to 2.33 
mishaps in 1983 and has held steady around 1.5 mishaps since.  The Air Force 
implemented the Operational Risk Management (ORM) program in 1996 in an effort to 
protect their most valuable resources:  aircraft and aviators.  An AFIT thesis conducted in 
1999 by Capt Park Ashley studied the Army’s similar Risk Management (RM) program.  
Ashley concluded that since his analysis found that RM did not affect the Army’s mishap 
rates, the AF should not expect to see its rates decline due to ORM implementation. 
The purpose of this thesis was to determine whether the implementation of ORM 
has had any affect on the AF’s mishap rates.  Analysis was conducted on annual and 
quarterly mishap rates, quarterly sortie mishap rates, and individual mishap data using 
three statistical techniques:  comparison of means testing, discontinuous piecewise linear 
regression, and chi-squared goodness of fit testing.  Results showed that the 
implementation of ORM did not effectively reduce the Air Force’s aviation mishap rates. 
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THE AIR FORCE OPERATIONAL RISK MANAGEMENT PROGRAM AND 
 
AVIATION SAFETY  
 
 
I.  Introduction 
 
 
Background 
 Man’s quest to fly has always been accompanied by mishaps that take lives, 
destroy or damage aircraft, and cost countless dollars in damages.  Although technology 
and experience have made flying a much safer endeavor, the inevitable losses are 
staggering.  Military aircraft are particularly susceptible to mishap, given the combat role 
of many military airframes.  Since its birth in 1947, the Air Force has lost 6,849 pilots 
and 13,626 aircraft, both of which are the Air Force’s most precious resources (AF Safety 
Center, 2002).  Despite the drastic reduction in mishap rate, between 1990 and 1996 the 
Department of Defense (DoD) suffered aviation losses of over $9.4 billion (Department 
of Defense, 1997). 
Given the importance of these resources, improving aviation safety is critical.  
Traditional measures of mishap prevention are aircraft technological improvements and 
flight mishap investigations.  Because human error contributes to the majority of aviation 
mishaps and is a contributing factor to approximately 70 percent of DoD Class A mishaps 
(Air Force Safety Center, 2003b), another methodology which focused on the aviator was 
needed.  A study conducted by the Defense Science Board Task Force on Aviation Safety 
concluded that initiating a program of risk management for all the services would be the 
most efficient and effective means of reducing mishaps (Department of Defense, 1997).   
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The Army began fielding a risk management program formally in 1987 and 
enjoyed a reduction in its Class A mishap rate since.  The Air Force Operational Risk 
Management (ORM) program was implemented in Sep 1996 as a means to reduce 
aviation mishaps.  The program was intended to enhance safety and overall mission 
effectiveness by instilling a structured system of decision-making processes to evaluate 
situations, identify risks, and determine optimal courses of actions. 
Air Force leadership recently indicated that they were moderately pleased with 
the progress of the ORM program thus far, but were looking for improvements in the 
future.  General John P. Jumper, Air Force Chief of Staff, upon reviewing the results 
from an Inspector General ORM Eagle Look in early 2002, released a memorandum in 
June addressing the program status (Jumper, 2002a). 
According to the memorandum, the Air Force had been moderately successful in 
the implementation of the program goals, but was not as far along as it could be.  General 
Jumper cited the Eagle Look as reporting a general lack of leadership emphasis and 
inadequate training programs as the primary areas of improvement.  The memorandum 
called for senior leaders and commanders to put a higher priority on ORM, noting that the 
program cannot reach its maturity without their improved participation.  Additionally, 
General Jumper directed leaders and commanders to emphasize training and to remain 
active in the overall ORM process (Jumper, 2002a). 
Captain Park Ashley conducted a thesis (Ashley, 1999) on the Risk Management 
(RM) program used by the Army.  His objective was to develop a predictive tool to 
estimate the future success of the Air Force ORM program.  His work showed that RM 
did not improve the Army’s mishap rates, and raised questions as to the potential efficacy 
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of ORM as an accident preventive treatment for the Air Force.  Enough time has now 
passed with the Air Force experience to perform a more thorough study to determine 
whether the ORM program has been successful. 
Problem Statement 
Aviation mishaps are extremely costly in terms of dollar value, public opinion, 
and human life.  The Air Force drastically reduced Class A mishap rates in its formative 
years.  The rate plummeted from 44.22 mishaps per 100,000 flight hours in 1947 to 2.33 
mishaps in 1983 and has held steady around 1.5 mishaps since (Air Force Safety Center, 
2002).  In an effort to protect their most valuable resources, aircraft and aviators, by 
further reducing modern mishap rates, the Air Force implemented the ORM program in 
1996, designed to establish an atmosphere of safety at all levels. 
Because recent studies of the Army’s RM program, the model for the Air Force’s 
ORM program, revealed that the program did not significantly improve Army aviation 
mishap rates, despite previous claims.  In fact, evidence was found suggesting that 
accident rates actually increased during RM implementation.  The study concluded that 
the Air Force should therefore not expect mishap rates to decline due to implementation 
of the ORM program. 
Research Question 
To what degree has the implementation of ORM affected flying safety in the Air 
Force? 
Investigative Questions 
The objective of this thesis effort is to analyze the efficacy of the ORM program 
in the reduction of aviation mishaps by tracking mishaps rates before, during, and after 
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ORM implementation.  Known causal factors will be investigated as well in an effort to 
determine the contribution of ORM to mishaps.  This research hopes to assist the Air 
Force effort to create a safer, more efficient organization.  The following investigative 
questions (IQ) will be addressed and answered in the proceeding chapters. 
IQ.1.  What factors are involved in an aviation mishap? 
IQ.2.  What is ORM and how is it applied and implemented? 
IQ.3.  Have mishaps rates changed significantly since ORM was implemented? 
IQ.4.  Are any differences caused by ORM? 
IQ.5.  Have the proportion of human factors mishaps changed since     
           implementation of ORM? 
Methodology 
 
 The Chapter 2 Literature Review addresses investigative questions 1 and 2 which 
are qualitative in nature and best answered by a thorough review of Air Force policy, 
mishap journals, documents and texts, and other Department of Defense (DoD) safety 
literature.   
To answer investigative questions 3, 4, and 5, a quantitative, statistical analysis of 
historical Air Force and Army mishap data was conducted.  Several methods of analysis 
and time series techniques were used and are discussed in Chapter 3, Methodology.   
Data Source 
 AF aviation data was gathered from the Air Force Safety Center (AFSC), Kirtland 
AFB, New Mexico.  Annual mishap rates and mishap numbers are available online at the 
AFSC website and includes Class A, B, and C mishap numbers and rates from 1947 to 
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2001. Army aviation data was obtained from the Army Safety Center  (ASC).  Additional 
causal data were provided upon request by AFSC and ASC. 
Scope and Limitations 
The focus of this thesis will be Air Force aviation mishaps.  This effort will study 
primarily Class A aviation mishaps: those that cost more than one million dollars, destroy 
an aircraft, or result in the loss of a life.  Less catastrophic Class B data will also be 
analyzed to determine what additional effects ORM may have had.  Army Class A, B and 
C data was also analyzed to confirm Ashley’s findings. 
Statistical procedures for non-parametric data differ from that of parametric data.  
Where the delineation between the two types of data was unclear, both types of 
procedures were used for the sake of thoroughness. 
Assumptions 
Significant non-compliance with ORM regulations would change the results of 
this study, however, determining whether personnel are actually utilizing ORM tools and 
instructions is another field of study that has not been addressed.  Therefore, this thesis 
assumes that personnel are adhering to Air Force and Army directed implementation of 
the ORM program.   
It is imperative to note that the implementation of an organization-wide effort 
such as ORM does not happen instantaneously.  The Air Force officially began its ORM 
program on 2 Sep 96, but full implementation, accomplished via individual computer 
awareness training was not completed until 1 Oct 98.  This potentially confounding two-
year implementation period was accounted for in analyses in Chapter 4. 
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Summary    
 This chapter introduced the Air Force ORM program and identified the objective 
of determining its affect on aviation safety.  It discussed the background, problem, 
investigative questions, methodology, data source, scope, and assumptions of this thesis 
document.  The next four chapters of this research effort include the Literature Review, 
Methodology, Analysis and Results, and Conclusions. 
 The Literature Review provides a broad overview of the nature of aviation 
mishaps, the Air Force and Army risk management programs, and other issues relevant to 
the research objective.  The findings contained within were essential to defining the scope 
of the project, developing an understanding of the subject matter, and laying foundations 
for the statistical analysis of the mishap data. 
 The Methodology chapter describes the various statistical methods, tests, and 
techniques used to analyze the data.  It also details the typology of the research design 
and the various threats to validity. 
The Findings and Analysis chapter presents the data obtained and the results of 
the statistical analysis.  This section answers the investigative questions posited in 
Chapter 1 and discusses the end results of the research effort. 
 The Conclusions chapter ends the thesis by presenting the research findings and 
their relevance and significance.  This chapter also poses recommendations for the future 
and potential topics for future study in the arena of aviation mishaps. 
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II.  Literature Review 
 
Overview 
 
 The goal of this literature review is to provide a background into the various 
aspects of aviation safety and its relationship to operational risk management.  Initially, 
the various aviation safety factors are identified and described and mishap prevention 
methods are discussed.  A discussion of relevant risk management and safety terms and 
definitions as defined by the Air Force and Army are then provided.  Finally, the 
implementation of risk management by both the Air Force and Army is outlined. 
Aviation Safety Factors 
 
 There are countless numbers of factors that affect aviation safety:  bird strikes, 
fatigue, weather, psychological conditions, parts failure, controlled flight into terrain, 
operations tempo, etc.   Ashley (1999) identified a model that incorporates these factors.  
The model is shown in Figure 1.   
 
Figure 1.  Aviation Mishap Cause Factors (Ashley, 1999) 
Ofeiatioiu Tenifo^ 
Mateml F^i^TE                         / ( 
Aviation 
J \                   EtiviioiiRi&ntid 
Ofer 
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The model follows the four mishap cause classifications outlined in DODI 
6055.7; human factors, material failure, environmental, and other (Department of 
Defense, 1989).  Both the Air Force and the Army follow this basic model for the 
purposes of classifying mishap causes.  Ashley also identified a fifth possible factor--
operations tempo.  These five primary cause factors will now be discussed. 
Human Factors. 
 
 Human factors describe mishap causes that relate to human error or the human 
condition.  Primarily, they refer to the pilot of the flown aircraft but the factors may also 
pertain to involved ground crew and supervisory roles.  Examples of human factors 
include poor judgment, improper risk assessment, psychological conditions, 
physiological conditions, and many more.  All of which, alone or in conjunction with 
other factors, can lead to an aviation mishap.  Several key human factors related concepts 
are now discussed in greater detail, including a classification system, age, and controlled 
flight into terrain. 
The Human Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS). 
 
Due to the high rate of mishaps attributed to human factors (between 60 and 80%) 
much research has been conducted on the causes of human error.  Studies of specific 
failures in human decision making led to the development of HFACS (Shappell and 
Wiegmann, 2000).  HFACS is a tool used to identify and classify the human factors 
causing aviation mishaps and is employed by all of the services in aviation accident 
investigation and analysis.   
 HFACS is based on the premise that human factor aviation accidents are not 
isolated incidents; rather, they are the result of a definite chain of events that lead to 
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unsafe aircrew behavior and ultimately, an accident.  HFACS is used to assist accident 
investigations in uncovering and categorizing the causes of mishaps and aid in the 
development of safer practices. 
The system, which has been embraced by many in the aviation industry, defines 
four tiers of an accident’s chain of events.  They are first) organizational influences, 
second) unsafe operations, third) preconditions for unsafe acts, and fourth) the actual 
unsafe acts of the aircrew.  The HFACS further delineated 17 causal categories of human 
errors within those four tiers. 
 In the first tier, Organizational Influences, improper resource management, unsafe 
organizational climates, or poor organizational processes are identified as possible causes 
of mishaps (Shappell and Wiegmann, 2000). 
The second tier, Unsafe Supervision, refers to inadequate supervision, 
inappropriately planned operations, uncorrected problems, and supervisory violations.  
The first and second tier are only applicable in commercial and military environments, 
where organizations and leaders are involved in flying operations and are not applicable 
in general aviation, where aircraft are privately operated (Shappell and Wiegmann, 2000). 
The third tier, Preconditions for Unsafe Acts, includes substandard conditions of 
the operator, such as adverse mental and physiological states and physical and mental 
limitations.  Also included are substandard practices of the operators; either failures in 
crew resource management or personal readiness (Shappell and Wiegmann, 2000). 
 The final tier, the Unsafe Acts of the Operators, is comprised of violations, both 
routine and exceptional, and errors, including decision, skill-based, and perceptual errors 
(Shappell and Wiegmann, 2000). 
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Age. 
 
One possible source of human errors in aviation mishaps is pilot age.  A study 
was conducted in 2002 to determine whether pilots of different age groups believed that 
their piloting skills, such as reaction speed, concentration, and decision making had 
deteriorated over time.  The study, which polled over 1,300 airline pilots, used 
questionnaires employing the 5-point Likert rating system to rate their abilities at the 
present and in the past.  The results of the test showed that most pilots, regardless of age, 
reported that their abilities declined while under stress and anxiety.  It also concluded that 
older pilots were not more likely than younger pilots to report negative changes in their 
abilities, suggesting that age is not perceived by aviators as a significant cause of error 
(Rebok and others, 2002).   
Based on the literature, it is inconclusive whether age is a direct factor in aviation 
mishaps.  It would seem more likely that physiological factors associated with aging 
would have a more profound affect.  The mean age of aircrew involved in AF Class A 
and B mishaps was approximately 31 years of age.  Unfortunately, since successful sortie 
data was not available, we cannot draw any conclusions about whether age has an impact 
on the likelihood of mishap occurrences. 
CFIT. 
 
 Controlled Flight Into Terrain, or CFIT, occurs when an aircraft flies into either 
water or land due to the inadequate situational awareness of the pilot.  It is a significant 
type of human factors related aviation mishap in the military, commercial, and general 
aviation environments.  The Navy/Marine Corps lost an average of ten aircraft per year 
11 
due to CFIT between 1983 and 1995.  Between 1990 and 1999, 32% of all commercial 
airline fatalities, adding up to over 2,100 deaths, occurred because of CFIT; the single 
greatest contributor to commercial losses.  And in a two-year period between 1993 and 
1994, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) identified 195 CFIT incidents (Shappel 
and Wiegmann, 2001). 
 In a study conducted by Shappell and Weigmann in 2001, it was determined that 
approximately 50% of CFIT mishaps were associated with decision errors, 45% with 
skill-based errors, 30% with violations, and 20% with perception errors.  Their research, 
aided by the HFACS, also determined that the use of decision making aids and recurring 
pilot training would decrease the likelihood of CFIT incidents (Shappel and Wiegmann, 
2001).  Despite the significant number of CFIT incidents, it is not considered a cause 
factor in and of itself, but rather a combination of various human factors. 
Material Causes. 
 
The second largest causal contributor to aviation mishaps is material failure.  
From 1993 to 1998, the Air Force experienced material related mishaps in 12% of Class 
A accidents, 27% of Class B accidents, and 39% of Class C accidents (Ashley, 1999).  
Aircraft are composed of thousands of intricately interwoven complex parts.  It is only 
natural then that failures occur.  Although a material failure would likely be traced back 
to a human error at some point in its production life cycle, this thesis is studying the 
immediate causes of mishaps and so material failures remain an important topic.  
Material failures include faulty parts due to wear and tear and design and manufacturing 
problems.  The Air Force recognizes faulty design, parts failure, and manufacturing 
failures as contributors to this mishap category.  Similarly, the Army refers to instances 
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when materiel elements become inadequate as “Materiel Factors.”   (Department of the 
Army, 1999) 
Environmental Factors. 
 
 Another important are of mishap factors is environmental factors.  Environmental 
factors include contributors such as weather and wildlife strikes.  Aviation mishaps 
involving environmental mishaps are fairly common, with weather and bird strikes being 
the most common.  It should be noted that many mishaps with environmental factors 
involved are not solely blamed on the environmental cause, but are instead identified in 
conjunction with other human factors involving the failure to avoid the environmental 
obstacle.   Both the Air Force and the Army identify environmental factors as 
contributing factors to aviation mishaps. 
Weather. 
 
 Adverse weather conditions cause accidents every year and are considered to be 
one of the major contributing factors to aviation mishaps.  Weather conditions not only 
cause accidents outright but also contribute to mishaps caused by human factors.  A study 
conducted at the Naval Postgraduate School determined that 12% of all Naval Class A 
mishaps between 1990 and 1998 were weather related and that a further 19% of human 
factors mishaps during the same time period were also weather related (Cantu, 2001).  
Furthermore, statistics from a study of commercial aviation conducted by the FAA 
concur, concluding that 12% of fatal U. S. commercial carrier accidents were directly 
caused by weather conditions (Duquette, 1998). 
 The weather is clearly a major contributor to aviation safety concerns.  It is 
unpredictable and can be treacherous in numerous ways.  Visibility and ceiling 
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conditions, including fog, low ceilings, clouds, obscurity, and sand storms are all 
dangerous factors that aviators must contend with.  The wind is also a dangerous element.  
Crosswind, tailwind, gusts, and wind shear all contributed to accidents in Cantu’s study.  
Furthermore, the environment can produce icing problems, turbulence, precipitation, and 
electrostatic discharges that can adversely affect safe flying operations.  The major 
sources of adverse weather conditions were poor visibility (54%), wind (16%), and 
precipitation (12%) (Cantu, 2001). 
Bird Strikes. 
 
Contributing to the environmental dangers of aviation are the populations of birds 
taking residence near airports.  Despite their diminutive size relative to aircraft, bird 
strikes are responsible for a considerable number of mishaps each year.  Typically, such 
mishaps are caused when birds, many of which are endangered species and cannot be 
exterminated, are ingested into engine intakes, causing immediate damage and forcing 
engine failure.  Additionally, the dangers of direct impact are also considerable.  
According to one study, a twelve-pound fowl struck by an aircraft traveling at 150 mph 
generates the force of a thousand pound weight dropped from a height of ten feet 
(Birdstrike Committee USA, 2002).  Since 1973, the Air Force has suffered 32 aircraft 
losses and 35 fatalities due to bird strikes.  In an effort to reduce such numbers, the Air 
Force created the Bird/Wildlife Aircraft Strike Hazard Team to study the phenomena and 
work to solve the bird strike problem (BASH, 2002). 
Operations Tempo. 
 
In March 1999, two HH-60G Pave Hawk helicopters based at Nellis AFB, 
Nevada collided in mid-air, killing all twelve crewmembers aboard.  The ensuing 
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accident investigation report indicated that an unrelenting operations tempo was the 
underlying cause for the aircrew errors that caused the accident.  The squadron had 
recently been engaged in two simultaneous deployments and had been home only 10 
months out of the previous 3 years (Brandon, 1999).  Clearly, high operations tempo can 
be a contributor to aviation mishaps. 
Operations Tempo is a term widely used in discussions of today’s military forces.  
It generally refers to the workload of both organizations and individuals and is generally 
seen as an impediment to readiness and performance.  The Air Force defines operations 
tempo as the sum total of all activities a unit is involved in.  It includes deployments, 
TDY, inspections, productivity days, extended workdays, and normal workdays.  Due to 
recent awareness of high operations tempo, legislation has been developed forcing the 
services to more closely define tempo and more accurately track and compensate 
individual hardships. 
 Military leadership seems to agree that operations tempo is at an all time high.  
Two years before the events of September 11, 2001 and the subsequent actions in 
Afghanistan, all four services testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee that 
operations tempo was a major problem.  General Ryan of the Air Force reported that 
despite a force 40% smaller than during the Cold War, the Air Force was deploying four 
times as often.  General Shinseki of the Army testified that his service was busier than he 
had ever seen in his 35 years of experience.  All representatives agreed that smaller force 
structure combined with greater demands and insufficient budgets were creating 
problems (Status of the United States Military, 2002).  Continued operations since in 
Kosovo, East Timor, and the Middle East have added to the workload. 
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 Ashley (1999) identified Operations Tempo as a possible category of mishap 
factors, along with human, environmental, and material factors.  This literature review of 
operations tempo draws the conclusion that it is not a major category of mishap factors. 
Instead, operations tempo, much like CFIT, is a combination of a number of other factors, 
including organizational and physiological affects.   
It remains unclear to what degree operations tempo affects safe flying operations.  
In his thesis, Ashley (1999) notes that two separate studies, one conducted by the Air 
Force in 1994 and one by a Blue Ribbon Panel in 1995, found no direct statistical 
correlation between operations tempo and aviation mishaps.  Nevertheless, sustained 
periods of high operations tempo are often associated with psychological stress, fatigue, 
and emotional duress; a combination of human factors mishap contributors.  Recent 
studies have indicated that operations tempo can be linked to problems with retention, 
family stability, and medical readiness; all of which could be contributors to piloting or 
even maintenance errors (Castro & Adler, 1999). 
The next section of the literature review describes the differences between the Air 
Force and Army systems of mishap cause factor identification. 
Air Force Cause Factors 
 
 When determining the cause of an aviation mishap, the Air Force investigating 
agent first identifies a person or functional area as the causal finding agent.  Then a 
causal finding area is identified.  These areas are broadly defined categories within which 
the mishap occurred and include Logistics, Maintenance, Environmental, Operations, 
Support, and Unknown.  These categories and detailed explanations follow, and are 
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found in AFI 91-204, Safety Investigation and Reports (Department of the Air Force, 
2001).   
The Logistics area refers to findings related to acquisition, manufacturing, design, 
and procurement that do not involve individual maintenance or operations personnel.  
The Maintenance category attributes the cause to AF or contracted maintenance 
personnel.  Environmental factors are causal findings relating to animals or 
environmental conditions that could not be reasonably avoided.  The Operations area 
refers to the actual aviators involved.  Support areas include the various support functions 
at installations, including Civil Engineering, Supply, Transportation, etc. 
 Once a general causal finding area is designated, the investigators determine the 
specific reasons for the occurrence of the causal finding.  These reasons are categorized 
into four distinct areas:  People, Parts/Paper, Natural Phenomena, and Unknown.    
People. 
 
 People reasons are related directly to individuals involved in the finding and is 
further divided into three areas; Physical, Personnel, and Psychological Reasons.  
Physical Reasons refer to factors affecting the individual’s body and state of wellness.  
Factors include: 
- Ergonomic considerations:  weight or strength 
- Self Induced Stressors:  voluntary medication usage and alcohol abuse 
- Pathological:  mental or emotional illness 
- Perceptions:  misinterpretations of the environment and failure to react to 
surroundings 
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- Physiological:  problems or adverse conditions caused by normal biological 
functions, such as hyperventilation and fatigue 
Personnel Reasons are based on the qualifications of the individual involved in 
the mishap, including proficiency, manning, training, and unauthorized modifications.  
Proficiency reasons arise when individuals were properly trained and qualified at one 
time, but lacked the skills at the time of the incident to perform adequately.  Manning 
reasons occur when there are not enough qualified personnel available to properly 
accomplish the event.  Training reasons refer to situations where individuals are not 
sufficiently trained for the task.  Unauthorized modifications are modifications to 
equipment and/or aircraft made without official approval. 
Psychological Reasons refer to cognitive decisions and functions made by the 
causal individual.  Acceptable reasons include: 
- Accepted Risk:  a risk assessment was conducted correctly 
- Attention Management:  distractions and inattention 
- Cognitive Function:  misinterpretation of data, insufficient aptitude 
- Discipline:  intentional non-compliance of standards, “horseplay” 
- Emotional State:  personal feelings resulting in adverse behavior such as 
moodiness, complacency, and over-motivation 
- Inadequate Risk Assessment:  actions were taken without conducting a 
sufficient risk assessment 
- Judgment:  poor assessment of information 
- Preparation:  inadequate mission planning factors 
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Parts/Paper. 
 
 Parts/Paper Reasons are attributed to faulty equipment, design, or publications 
that contribute to the mishap.  This category of mishap reasons is further subdivided into 
five categories:  attrition, design, faulty-part, manufacture, and publications.  Attrition 
refers to “decisions made to replace by attrition rather in lieu of issuing a time 
compliance technical order or retrofit package.”  (Department of the Air Force, 2001)  
Design reasons occur when systems are inadequately designed or do not meet 
specifications.  Faulty-parts include defective aircraft parts or personal equipment.  
Manufacture reasons are designated when equipment is defective due to manufacturing 
problems.  Publication reasons occur when technical orders, instructions and other paper 
work are misleading or inadequate. 
Environmental. 
 
 The Air Force categorizes natural phenomena reasons into either Animal or 
Environmental Conditions categories.  Animal reasons refer to collisions with animals, 
ingestion of animals into engine intakes, and mishaps due to attempted avoidance of 
animals.  Environmental Conditions occur due to weather conditions such as high winds 
and fog.  It should be noted that these occurrences are used as reasons only when 
reasonable preparations were made to avoid them.  For example, a lightning strike during 
a thunderstorm cannot be the cause of a mishap if an adequate weather forecast was 
available and the thunderstorm could have been avoided. 
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Unknown. 
  
Any mishap for which a reason cannot be determined falls into the Unknown 
category.  Investigators who categorize mishaps into this category must provide a fully 
descriptive narrative explaining the selection of this reason.  
Army Causes  
 
 The Army recognizes three categories of aviation mishap causes; human factors, 
materiel factors, and environmental factors.  Army Regulation 385-40 describes 
procedures for the investigation and classification of the mishaps into the three broad 
categories, but are not as specific as the Air Force in labeling the causes. 
Human Factors. 
The Army defines Human Factors as “human interactions (man, machine, and/or 
environment) in a sequence of events that were influenced by, or the lack of human 
activity, which resulted or could result in an Army accident.”  Human factors that lead to 
accidents are largely caused by human error, which is also defined by the regulation.  
Human errors are human acts that deviated from the operational requirements of the act.  
The reporting of human factors as a causal agent in Army mishaps is less categorized 
than the Air Force reporting system, but according to the regulation, such errors are 
generally attributable to inefficiencies in training, standards, leaders, the individual, or 
other support areas.   
Materiel Factors. 
Materiel factors may cause accidents when materiel elements of a vehicle, 
equipment, or a system become inadequate or counter-productive to its operation.  This 
includes design failures and malfunctions that directly lead to an aviation mishap. 
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Environmental Factors. 
Environmental Factors may be the cause of a mishap when environmental 
conditions, such as weather or wildlife, could have adversely affected the equipment or 
aircraft being operated or the actual performance of the individual operators. 
Prevention Factors 
 
 The ultimate goal of identifying mishap causes is to develop a prescription to 
prevent their future occurrence.  This section addresses areas of mishap prevention 
including human factors programs, mishap investigation, leadership, and technological 
advancements. 
Human Factors Programs. 
 
 One of the aviation industry’s efforts to reduce aviation mishaps due to human 
factors was the implementation of Crew Resource Management (CRM).  CRM is a 
training system that was developed to enhance the interaction between members of a 
flight crew.  It consists of training focused on standardized procedures and operations that 
sharpen aircrew communications.  Crews are trained to work together more fluidly and 
efficiently by task sharing during high workload scenarios.  Such methods were designed 
to create a more effective sense of teamwork and to subsequently reduce 
miscommunication and mishaps.  The Air Force instituted a CRM training program in 
1994 and was found to be beneficial in multiple crew environments (Department of the 
Air Force, 1995).  
 CRM’s effectiveness in reducing mishaps is questionable as other sources showed 
no statistical improvement due to CRM.  Some studies have shown that while CRM 
training does effectively promote better communication patterns, learning, and team-
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oriented behavior, its implementation has not significantly reduced mishap rates 
(Johnson, 2002) or that the results are indeterminate (Burke, et al., 2002).  Some suggest 
that CRM’s apparent failure occurs because its practices breakdown during critical or 
abnormal conditions, such as when aircrew are fatigued, when under heavy workload, or 
while subjected to dangerous environmental surroundings (Johnson, 2002). 
 HFACS, discussed earlier, is another key tool used to prevent human factors 
mishaps.  HFACS assists investigators in the identification of mishap causes involving 
human factors, ultimately assisting in the dissemination of prevention information. 
Mishap Investigations. 
 
 One of the Department of Defense’s primary methods of accident prevention is 
the identification and understanding of past failures through accident investigations.  By 
analyzing the causal factors involved in aviation accidents, better controls for the 
prevention of future ones can be developed and implemented.  Generally, safety 
investigation boards are convened to collect evidence, analyze the data, and determine 
what caused the mishap.  The board writes reports and disseminates the findings to 
aircraft designers and users to facilitate future prevention. 
 The DoD accident investigation system is based on four principles.  First, 
investigations are carried out by an unbiased and disinterested third party to ensure a fair 
and even assessment of the situation.  Assignment of investigative duties is prescribed by 
the services’ instructions on accident investigation.  Second, investigators will be 
assigned based on the necessary training and skills, commensurate with the severity and 
complexity of the investigation.  Third, reports of the investigation are reviewed by the 
chain of command above the organization involved.  Fourth, lessons learned are 
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disseminated to the entire community to aid future prevention and corrective actions are 
implemented and tracked (Schilder, 2002). 
 The investigation is a lengthy process.  The accident is classified according to its 
severity.  Data is collected to determine damages and injuries.  The accident is 
categorized based on the causal factors and activities involved. 
 Once the investigation has been concluded, it essential that any lessons learned 
from the accident are disseminated to the involved community.  There are many tools 
provided by the DoD to aid in this effort, including on-line safety databases and software.  
The Air Force, Army, and Naval Safety Centers are the focal points for safety discussions 
and the lesson dissemination. 
 Each service has its own process and agency responsible for investigations.  This 
concept was challenged by a Defense Task Force study in 1997 to determine if there was 
a need for a joint agency.  The task force noted that most investigations are rapidly 
accomplished within 60 days, have thorough participation by their associated Safety 
Centers, and are service specific based on mission needs. It was furthermore noted that 
although the services use separate procedures, they all successfully follow the 
fundamentals of accident investigation.  The task force concluded that no joint office of 
investigation was needed (Department of Defense, 1997). 
The Air Force investigation procedures are documented in AFI 91-204, Safety 
Investigations and Reports.  This enormous, 519-page instruction outlines the entire 
process, beginning with the determination of responsibilities and the composition of the 
Safety Investigation Board (SIB), which investigates the accident.  The SIB is responsible 
for all aspects of the investigation, including categorization of causal factors and 
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classification of the mishap.  They conduct the investigation, which consists of data 
collection, evidence gathering, interviews and other procedures.  The SIB prepares safety 
messages, media information releases, and a number of formal reports to document the 
investigation.   
 The Army conducts its investigations using the “3W” approach laid out in DA 
PAM 385-40, Army Accident Investigation and Reporting.  First, the investigators 
determine what happened by identifying the causal factors; human, materiel, or 
environmental.  Second, why it happened is investigated by examining the leadership, 
training, procedures, support, and the individual involved.  Thirdly, what to do about it in 
the future is determined by making recommendations for fixes, remedial measures, and 
countermeasures. 
 The actual investigation takes place in phases.  Phase I is the organization of the 
investigation board and a preliminary examination.  Phase II is the data collection phase, 
where evidence is collected and grouped into the human, materiel, and environmental 
factor categories.  Phase III sees data analyzed and findings compiled.  Phase IV is the 
completion of the technical report for the recording of the investigations findings. 
 Policy for civilian investigations is developed by FAA.  The guidelines for 
aircraft mishap investigations are documented in Order 8020.11B, Aircraft Accident and 
Incident Notification, Investigation, and Reporting (Department of Transportation, 2000).  
The National Transformation Safety Board (NTSB) is an outside agency that conducts 
the investigations.  It coordinates throughout with the FAA, determining the causes of the 
incident and ultimately making recommendations for future prevention efforts.   
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Leadership. 
 
 The leadership role is one of the critical areas where ORM principles can be 
effectively utilized to improve safety.  Both the Air Force and the Army identify leaders 
as shouldering the burden of ensuring ORM is adhered to under their command.   
 The Air Force states in its ORM policy directive that “all Air Force Personnel will 
apply ORM principles, concepts and techniques.”  It is an all-encompassing program for 
all ranks to adhere to.  The role of the commander is to tailor the ORM program to the 
unit’s needs and ensure the unit’s implementation and sustainment of ORM into decision-
making (Department of the Air Force, 2000c).  The commander assumes the ultimate 
responsibility for ORM adherence at his or her level of command. 
 Air Force leadership is highly involved beginning at the headquarters level.  AF 
Chief of Staff, General John P. Jumper, stated in his memo regarding ORM that “Air 
Force senior leaders and commanders at all levels have to provide the continuing 
emphasis necessary for ORM to reach full maturity.”  (Jumper, 2002a)  The Chief of 
Staff establishes safety policy and guidance.  Headquarters staffs serve as the principle 
advocates for the program, ensuring plans and programs are distributed and adhered to.  
The AF Safety Center serves as the lead agency and overall program manager for the 
integration of ORM into the AF.  It also monitors advancements in the safety realm.  
Safety staffs are formed at all levels where needed, including MAJCOM, wing, and flight 
levels.  Additionally, Flight Safety Officers and Functional Program Managers serve their 
commanders to ensure ORM is integrated, trained, and utilized throughout (Department 
of the Air Force, 2000c).  A more detailed discussion of ORM responsibilities is included 
in a later section. 
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The Army field manual states that although the responsibility for safety runs 
throughout the ranks, “commanders—with the assistance of their leaders and staffs—
manage accident risks,” and that only after the principles are embraced and enforced by 
commanders will the Army recognize “the full power of risk management.”  (Department 
of the Army, 1998)  While the aviator is identified as the core of aviation mishap 
prevention, leadership must be intimately involved. 
Technological Improvements. 
 
 The drastic reduction in mishap rates since the early days of the AF in the 1940s 
are primarily attributed to technological improvements and innovations.  General 
improvements in the aircraft, more reliable engines, and more sophisticated aviation 
systems have all contributed to the rate reductions.  Technological improvements 
continue to advance the cause of safety, although their direct contributions to mishap 
reduction rates declines (Driskell and Adams, 1992). 
 Today, various organizations within the government are involved in finding safer 
ways to fly, including the FAA, NASA, DoD, and NTSB.  Research is constantly being 
conducted to find better techniques and technologies in areas such as ejection seats, air 
control systems, weather forecasting systems, and aircraft component design.  NASA is 
currently involved in several projects, including conducting research on fatigue and an 
aviation incident reporting system that would collect mishap data and dispense it via 
messages and alerts to its users. (Human Factors, 2002)  The FAA is currently conducting 
high-tech weather studies to learn more about the effect weather has on flying (Aviation 
Studies, 2002). 
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Definitions and Concepts 
 
 The next section of the chapter is dedicated to defining the critical terminology 
involved in the ORM programs and aviation mishaps.  The following terms are defined 
by DODI 6055.7, Accident Investigation, Reporting, and Record Keeping.  This 
instruction outlines general procedures for reporting accidents to higher headquarters.  It 
also contains a number of important definitions which are used by the DoD to standardize 
accident reporting. 
Accident. 
 
 Accidents are defined by the DoD as an “unplanned event, or series of events, that 
results in damage to DoD property,” (Department of Defense, 2000) and includes 
occupational illnesses and injuries to personnel.  Also included under this definition are 
incidents whereby non-DoD property and individuals are damaged or injured due to DoD 
operations. 
Accident Classification. 
 
 The DoD standardizes accident classifications using a system based on the 
severity of the mishap.  Major accidents are designated as A, B, or C Class, with class A 
accidents being the most severe.  Severity is determined by both the dollar value of lost 
assets (including environmental cleanup and restoration costs) and the resulting injuries 
or illnesses.  Class C figures were changed in 2002 from a minimum value of $10,000 up 
to $20,000.  Table 1 outlines DoD accident classifications. 
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Table 1.  Accident Classification Specifications (Department of Defense, 2000) 
Accident 
Class 
Damage Costs Injury 
A $1,000,000 or more 
Destroyed Aircraft 
Fatality 
Permanent Total Disability 
B $200,000 < $1,000,000 Permanent Partial Disability 
3 or More Personnel Hospitalized 
C $20,000 < $200,000 Non-fatal Injury/Illness/Disability 
Causes Loss of Duty Time 
 
 
 Intent for Flight. 
 
 Intent for flight is an important term in the realm of aviation mishap 
categorization.  It is used as a starting and stopping point for the classification of aviation 
accidents, as the existence of intent for flight differentiates between flight accidents and 
ground accidents.  Intent for flight begins when an aircraft releases its brakes or when 
takeoff power is applied when beginning an authorized flight.  Intent for flight ends when 
the aircraft has completed its flight and taxies clear of the runway.  In the case of vertical 
landing aircraft, intent ends when the aircraft has touched down and is supported by its 
landing gear. 
Types of Aviation Accidents. 
 
 The DoD categorizes all accidents into one of the following:  aircraft, explosive 
and chemical agents, motor vehicles, ground and industrial, off-duty, unmanned aerial, 
guided missiles, maritime, nuclear, or space.   Aircraft accidents are further segregated 
into three types of accidents:  flight, flight-related, and ground accidents.   
 Flight accidents, which are the sole concern of this thesis, are accidents in which 
reportable damage to an aircraft occurred under circumstances where intent for flight 
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existed.  Additionally, incidents involving explosives, missiles, or chemical agents 
causing damage to aircraft are reported in this category to avoid redundant reporting. 
 Flight-related accidents are accidents under intent for flight that occur when there 
is no damage to the aircraft, but involve injury or fatality to aircrew, ground crew, or 
passengers or damage to other property.   
 Ground accidents occur when there is injury or property damage without intent 
for flight, but while aircraft engines are in operation.  This category includes flight decks 
of naval vessels. 
 Flight-related and ground accident occurrences are not used to calculate flight 
accident rates and are therefore not incorporated into this study. 
Accident Rates. 
 
 Accident rates, which are commonly used to report aviation safety trends, are a 
measure of the recorded number of accidents per units of exposure.  For example, Class 
A accident rates are calculated as the number of accidents per 100,000 flying hours. 
Risk. 
 
 The fundamental concept in the development of risk management is that of risk 
itself.  As a first step in eliminating aircraft accidents by reducing risk, one must 
understand what risk is.  Risk, as a noun in this context, is defined as the “exposure to 
possible loss or injury (The Merriam Webster Dictionary, 1994).”   
The military services define risk similarly while emphasizing intrinsically military 
aspects such as the role of ‘adversaries’ and ‘personnel.’  The Air Force definition is “an 
expression of consequences in terms of the probability of an event occurring, the severity 
of the event and the exposure of personnel or resources to potential loss or harm 
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(Department of the Air Force, 2000a).”  The Army definition is “the probability and 
severity of a potential loss that may result from hazards due to the presence of an enemy, 
an adversary, or some other hazardous condition (Department of the Army, 1998).”   
Risk Management. 
 
 The Air Force and the Army use slightly different terminology to describe the 
concept of risk management.  The Air Force uses the term ‘Operational Risk 
Management (ORM)’ while the Army uses the term ‘Risk Management (RM).’   
 The Air Force defines ORM as “a decision-making process to systematically 
evaluate possible courses of action, identify risks and benefits, and determine the best 
course of action for any given situation.”  (Department of the Air Force, 2000a)  It calls 
for all levels to utilize the systems for all situations, both on- and off-duty.  It states that 
proper implementation of the program will increase the overall strength of the Air 
Force’s war fighting ability by enhancing mission accomplishment and preserving 
resources and individuals. 
 The Army defines RM as “the process of identifying, assessing, and controlling 
risks arising from operational factors and making decisions that balance risk costs with 
mission benefits.”  (Department of the Army, 1998)  It calls for all levels, from soldiers 
to leaders, to implement risk management and states that the principles apply to all 
manners of operations and environments within the service.  It notes the importance of 
leaders being able to properly apply risk management in order to conserve resources, 
protect personnel, and develop competent leaders and units. 
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ORM Principles. 
 
 AFI 90-901, Operational Risk Management (Department of the Air Force, 2000a), 
identifies four key principles that must be applied when managing risk.  The instruction 
states that the principles should be used at all stages of decision-making; before, during, 
and after and should be used continuously when risk is present. 
1) Accept no unnecessary risk:  Unnecessary risk does not involve a positive return 
of benefits.  From day to day operations to combat missions, risk is almost always 
involved at some level.  The instruction urges members to accomplish their 
objectives while minimizing exposure to such unnecessary risks. 
2) Make risk decisions at the appropriate level:  Individuals who are accountable for 
the completion of operations are responsible for making risk decisions.   
3) Accept risk when benefits outweigh the costs:  Unlike situations involving 
unnecessary risk, acceptable risk involves gained benefits due to undertaken risk.  
Acceptable risk can be identified when potential costs are compared to potential 
benefits.  Such undertakings are acceptable, but individuals should always attempt 
to minimize the risk and maximize the benefits. 
4) Integrate ORM into operations and planning at all levels:  From individuals at the 
lowest level conducting operations to the commanders at the highest levels 
establishing policy, risk management should be comprehensively applied.   
The Army Risk Management program cites similar principles in FM 100-14, Risk 
Management (Department of the Army, 1998).  Portions of the language used differ from 
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that of the Air Force’s principles, but the message is generally the same.  It identifies 
three key principles as a framework around which the program is built. 
1) Integrating risk management into mission planning, preparations, and execution 
2) Making risk decisions at the appropriate level in the chain of command 
3) Accepting no unnecessary risk 
Risk Management Process. 
 
 The Air Force’s risk management process is based on several key fundamentals.  
It is designed to be a comprehensive system but must be tailored to fit each unique 
situation being addressed.  The system outlines steps that provide tools for individuals to 
manage the immediate risk and provides six steps to use that define the risk management 
process. 
1) Identify the Hazards:  Use various hazard identification techniques to identify the 
hazards at hand. 
2) Assess the Risk:  The application of qualitative and/or quantitative assessment 
techniques should be used to determine the probability of risk and the implicit 
danger involved. 
3) Analyze Risk Control Measures:  Determine strategies that may be used to avoid, 
minimize, or eliminate the perceived risk. 
4) Make Control Decisions:  Make a decision at the appropriate level based on the 
cost-benefit analysis. 
5) Implement Risk Controls:  Carry out the selected strategy. 
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6) Supervise and Review:  Continual review of the chosen strategy and the results of 
the action should be accomplished periodically to ensure success and 
improvement over time. 
The Army incorporates a very similar five-step process while implementing its 
Risk Management program.  The primary difference is that it combines control 
development and decision making into one step. 
1) Identify Hazards 
2) Assess Hazards to Determine Risks 
3) Develop Controls and Make Risk Decisions 
4) Implement Controls 
5) Supervise and Evaluate 
Fundamental Goals of ORM. 
 
 AFPD 90-9 highlights the overall goals of the ORM program (Department of the 
Air Force, 2000b).  In general, understanding and minimizing risk will maximize mission 
effectiveness and ensure the highest levels of readiness for the Air Force.  The directive 
identifies four separate goals:   
1) Enhance mission effectiveness:  Incorporation of ORM principles and practices 
will enhance all levels of mission effectiveness by preserving assets and keeping 
personnel safe and healthy. 
2) Integrate ORM into processes:  ORM should be integrated into mission processes 
at all times and decisions should be based on risk assessments. 
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3) Comprehensive acceptance at all levels:  All personnel should be trained and 
motivated to use ORM in all situations where risk is involved, both on- and off-
duty. 
4) Improve war fighting capabilities:  By utilizing the ORM concepts of cost-benefit 
analysis, the Air Force war fighters will make better, more informed battlefield 
decisions and will in turn help ensure victory in combat situations. 
Responsibilities 
 
 While all personnel are responsible for their own use of ORM principles, different 
levels of each service have more specific, greater encompassing responsibilities. 
AF Responsibilities. 
 Responsibility for the implementation of ORM practices fall on all members of 
the Air Force, starting from the top levels of AF Headquarters down to the individual 
personnel at the unit level.  Table 2 summarizes the basic responsibilities for the various 
levels of the Air Force. 
Table 2.  AF ORM Responsibilities  (Department of the Air Force, 2000c) 
Unit Level Responsibilities 
Headquarters USAF Advocate ORM, develop implementation and sustainment 
plans, appoint program focal point 
Safety Center 
 
Lead agency for integration, designate overall ORM 
Program Manager, guidance and oversight for all program 
policies 
Academy, Training 
Command 
Integrate ORM into training and education programs 
MAJCOM Develop command specific guidance 
Commanders Tailor basic ORM program guidelines to specific 
missions, develop implementation and sustainment plans 
for units 
Functional Program 
Managers 
Integrate ORM processes into unit training programs 
Personnel Apply ORM principles and practices into day-to-day 
activities 
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 The AF has also formed a number of teams to help ensure the propagation of the 
ORM program.  The AF ORM Steering Committee, co-chaired by the AF Assistant Vice 
Chief of Staff and the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Environment, Safety, and 
Occupational Health, meets annually and provides senior leadership with review and 
approval of ORM policy and strategy.  The AF ORM Integrated Process Team is chaired 
by the ORM Program Manager, meets semi-annually, and develops plans needed to 
facilitate AF-wide implementation of ORM.  An AF ORM Working Group consisting of 
MAJCOM ORM representatives brings MAJCOM requirements together to assist in 
policy development (Department of the Air Force, 2000b). 
Army Responsibilities. 
The Army utilizes a similar structure for the responsibility of their RM program.    
The headquarters level of the Army has overall responsibility for the protection of the 
force.  The Secretary of the Army is assisted by the Assistant Secretaries of Installations 
and Environments and Financial Management and the Chief of Staff of the Army for top-
level program guidance (Department of the Army, 1998). 
 The Director of Army Safety oversees direct management of the Army aviation 
accident prevention program.  The director also runs the Army Safety Center, which is 
the focal point for Army aviation accident investigations, research and analysis of 
aviation accidents, and development of risk management options for commanders 
(Department of the Army, 1998). 
 Major Army Command (MACOM) commanders develop risk decision authority 
level policies.  MACOM commanders including Training and Doctrine, Forces, and 
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Materiel commands develop specific guidance for their areas of responsibility 
(Department of the Army, 1998). 
 Commanders ensure that their units comply with all aspects of published safety 
guidance, including implementation of programs, training, evaluations, and establishing a 
written unit safety philosophy.  Commanders are aided by numerous personnel assigned 
to various safety responsibilities.  Table 3 outlines these positions. 
 Table 3.  Army RM Responsibilities (Department of the Army, 1998) 
Personnel Responsibilities 
Operations Officers Ensure aviators are trained and briefed on 
mission hazards and safety procedures 
Aviation Safety Officers Develop unit safety policy, objectives, and 
integration procedures 
Aviators Basic element in aviation safety, must be 
proficient and fit and incorporate unit 
safety procedures 
Aviation Maintenance Officers Ensures effective maintenance program is 
developed and maintained 
Flight Surgeon Advises commander on all medical safety 
issues 
Aviation Safety NCO Advises Aviation Safety Officer, liaison 
with enlisted personnel 
 
 
 The army aviator is the key element in the aviation safety process, but all 
individuals are ultimately responsible for understanding safety principles and 
incorporating them into day-to-day activities and for advising others about unsafe actions. 
Risk Management Implementation 
 
 It is useful to understand the methods and dates of ORM implementation to 
determine their effects on the study. 
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AF Implementation. 
 
 The Air Force began implementation of ORM in 1996 following the order of the 
Chief of Staff on 2 September 1996.  The Air Force places responsibility of integrating 
risk management at all levels; commanders, staff, supervisors, and individuals.  AFPAM 
90-902 provides a brief overview of each level of responsibility, for example, individuals 
should 1) understand, accept, and implement risk management processes, 2) maintain a 
constant awareness of the changing risks associated with the operation or task, and 3) 
make supervisors immediately aware of any unrealistic risk reduction measures or high 
risk procedures (Department of the Air Force, 2000b). 
 The Air Force delineates the levels of risk management based on a time-criticality 
factor.  The levels are; time-critical, deliberate, and strategic.  Time critical refers to 
decisions that must be made at the time of execution, for example, actual mission 
operation or off-duty safety scenarios.  Time-critical situations do not allow for the 
complete application of the ORM process to occur, and therefore calls for an on the spot 
mental or verbal review of the situation.  Deliberate risk management is not time 
sensitive and allows for the application of the complete process.  Examples of deliberate 
risk management can occur while planning upcoming operations.  Strategic risk 
management is deliberate risk management augmented with more thorough identification 
of hazards and procedures by data analysis and research.  Examples include the 
development of new weapon systems or tactics and training methods.   
 Feedback and evaluation of the ORM program is essential.  By taking direct 
measure of behavior, conditions, attitudes, knowledge and safety statistics, a commander 
can ascertain how effectively his unit is incorporating the ORM principles.    
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Army Implementation. 
 
 According to FM100-14, the Army began to incorporate the principles of risk 
management in the late 1980’s, where it was primarily the responsibility of the officer 
corps.  In 1987, the Army published AR 385-10, The Army Safety Program, which was 
the Army’s first formal effort at risk management (Department of the Army, 1998). 
General Dennis J. Reimer authorized the release of FM 100-14 in 1998, providing 
the Army with a new and comprehensive risk management program.  The Army clearly 
places responsibility for safety on all of its individuals; “Minimizing risk—eliminating 
unnecessary risk—is the responsibility of everyone in the chain of command (Department 
of the Army, 1998).”  FM100-14 outlines responsibilities for differing levels of authority, 
from commanders and leaders to staffs and soldiers.  Each level is faced with unique 
circumstances where the implementation of risk management is necessary and must have 
an ingrained understanding of the process to carry out the mission as safely as possible. 
 The integration of risk management into both training and operations is important 
and must not be treated as an afterthought.  FM100-14 directs leaders and managers to 
account for its implementation in the beginning of the budgeting and planning process.  
They must also ensure constant assessment tools are in place to continually track 
performance (Department of the Army, 1998).   
Summary 
 
 This chapter provided an overview of aviation safety and its relevance to 
operational risk management principles.  It began with a model and a discussion of 
aviation mishap factors, collating the various mishap causes into four distinct mishap 
factors; human, environmental, material, and other.  A discussion of prevention 
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techniques ensued, including leadership, mishap investigation, human factors programs, 
and technological improvements.  The chapter then identified the critical terms and 
concepts and defined them as they pertained to the Air Force and Army ORM programs.  
Finally, a discussion of ORM implementation was provided, describing the differences 
and similarities between the Air Force and Army policies. 
 Through this literature review, it is evident that the Air Force has implemented 
ORM to instill an atmosphere of safety throughout its ranks and in particular, in the hopes 
that it will reduce its aviation mishaps.  The next chapter will describe how various 
aviation mishap data was analyzed to determine whether ORM was successful or not. 
39 
III.  Methodology 
 
 
Chapter Overview 
 
 This chapter focuses on the methodology used to answer the investigative 
questions.  First, a discussion of the research design is presented and threats to validity 
and reliability of the findings are examined.  Then, the focus shifts to identify and explain 
the various statistical tools, tests, and procedures that were employed.   
Research Design 
 
 This experiment was a quasi-experimental, time-series design.  It was not a true-
experiment as there was no control group available.  A time-series design has a series of 
initial observations that take place over a period of time, interrupted with a treatment, and 
followed by another series of observations.  The treatment being studied in this 
experiment is the implementation of ORM.  The design is depicted diagrammatically in 
Figure 2. 
 
 
Figure 2.  Research Design Diagram (Leedy and Ormrod, 2001) 
 
 
Quantitative Design. 
 
 This thesis was primarily a quantitative research design, focusing on deductive 
analysis and adhering to the distinguishing characteristics of such designs as described by 
Leedy and Ormrod (2001).  The methods utilized to answer the problem statement and its 
associated investigative questions involved studying the relationships of measured 
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variables and in particular, mishap rates.  Its purpose was to examine the causes of 
mishaps, develop a model using those factors, and to test the hypothesis that ORM did 
not effectively reduce mishap rates.   
Data Issues  
Several types of data were collected from a representatively large sample of the 
population.  The primary source of data was the Air Force Safety Center (AFSC).  
Historical mishap rates and summary data were obtained from the AFSC website (Air 
Force Safety Center, 2002).  This included Class A, B, and C mishap rates and counts.  
AFSC database analysts provided additional mishap data, including causal counts, 
monthly mishap rates, and sortie numbers (Air Force Safety Center, 2003b).  Similarly, 
Army mishap rates and summary data were obtained from the Army Safety Center 
website, and mishap cause counts were provided by Safety Center analysts (Army Safety 
Center 2002).  Monthly flying hours and sorties, as well as individual mishap data were 
not available. 
Validity and Reliability 
 
 Experiments are subjected to a number of threats to validity and reliability.  This 
section addresses and describes a number of selected, pertinent threats and any 
methodologies used to counter them. 
Construct Validity. 
A construct is a complex, inferred concept.  In this study, theory states that risk 
management practices affect the likelihood of aviation mishaps. The two main constructs 
are the management practices and the likelihood of mishaps.  Construct validity, the first 
step in assuring a viable experiment, is a measurement of validity that “assesses the 
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extent to which the measure reflects the intended construct (Dooley, 2001).”  Common 
problems with construct validity include measurement threats such as excessive random 
error and incorrectly measured constructs.  This project intends to measure risk 
management’s impact through statistical analysis of mishap causal data.  Further threats 
to construct validity are the experimental threats of attrition and mortality.  Since many 
aviation mishaps end in pilot fatalities, these threats are pertinent and may affect results.   
Internal Validity. 
 Internal validity, defined by Dooley (2001) as the truthfulness of the claim that 
one variable causes another, is an essential element in any research effort.  Leedy and 
Ormrod (2001) refer to it as the extent to which the design and data of the research allows 
the researcher to draw accurate conclusions about the cause and effect and other 
questions.    If internal validity is obtained throughout an experiment, a legitimate causal 
linkage between the response and treatment variable is assured.  Otherwise, changes in 
the response variable could be due to another, unexplored cause.  In this research, the 
mishap rate is the response variable and risk management is the treatment.   The primary 
investigative objective is to determine if the treatment causes a significant change to the 
response variable. 
 Internal validity can be threatened by time related problems, group errors, and 
reverse causation (Dooley, 2001).  Time threats refer to rival causes other than the 
treatment variable that can affect the variable being measured and includes history, 
maturation, instrumentation, and pretest reactivity.  Group threats include selection, 
regression to the mean, and selection-by-time threat interactions.  Reverse causation is a 
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circumstance where the treatment variable is caused by the response variable—the 
opposite effect of the hypothesized relationship. 
History. 
History, a time threat to internal validity, is the single largest threat to this 
research effort.  History threats occur when events unrelated to the experimental 
treatment cause observed reactions from the response variable (Dooley, 2001).  Risk 
management was instituted as a means of preventing mishaps, but it is not the only effort 
put forth by the services to do so.  As discussed in Chapter II, other programs have been 
studied and used to make flying safer, such as the Crew Resource Management program, 
mishap investigations, and leadership initiatives.  These activities, which have been used 
for many years, are time threats to the hypothesized variable relationship.  However, as 
Ashley (1999) noted, such programs are together to be considered responsible for trends 
before the implementation of ORM for the Air Force in 1996 and RM for the Army in 
1987.  After implementation, ORM and RM bear the weight of any cause and effect 
relationships that may be observed.  An historical overview of such historical threats was 
conducted. 
  Conflicts. 
 It is possible that US involvement in military conflicts could affect flying safety.  
Wartime activities are accompanied by surges in operations and flying hours and puts 
many pilots into stressful combat situations.  It would seem likely that under such 
situations, the likelihood of incurring increased mishaps would increase, but this concept 
is not supported by data.   
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 A review of mishap rates during recent American conflicts do not show a 
corresponding increase in mishap rates.  Table 4 illustrates mishap trends during conflicts 
since the Korean War in 1950 to 1953. 
Table 4.  Mishap Trends During Conflicts (Air Force Safety Center, 2002) 
Conflict Years Mishap Rates Trend 
Afghanistan/Iraq 2001 to present 1.16 to 1.52 Increasing 
Kosovo 1999 2.48 to 1.57 Decreasing 
Gulf War 1991 1.82 to 0.82 Decreasing 
Vietnam 1959 to 1975 8.29 to 2.77 Decreasing 
Korea 1950 to 1953 36.48 to 24.42 Decreasing 
 
 
The data from Table 4 seems to show that flying safety improves during times of 
conflict.  Only during the current operations in Afghanistan and Iraq did the AF mishap 
rates increase.  All other major conflicts saw improved mishap rates.  Class B mishaps 
increased during Kosovo. 
  Aircraft. 
 Not all aircraft are created equal, and not all aircraft have the same roles in the 
AF.  Clearly, the single-engine, high-speed F-16 with a combat role leads a much more 
dangerous existence than the four-engine, slower moving C-141 with a non-combat role.  
For this reason, it was useful to examine the different airframes within the AF fleet to 
determine whether aircraft mix would have any affect on mishap rates.  The AF’s ten 
aircraft with the highest Class A mishap rates over the last ten years were:  U-2 (8.51), H-
53 (8.49), F-117 (4.62), H-60 (3.48), F-6 (3.35), F-111 (2.84), F-15 (2.04), T-43 (1.57), 
E-4/E-8 (high rates, but small sample size; low significance (Air Force Safety Center, 
2003a). 
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 Not surprisingly, the mishap leaders were predominantly a mix of fighters and 
helicopters.   Not a single transport made the list, and only one trainer (T-43).  The F-4, 
which began to phase out of the fleet in the late 1990’s had a history of high mishap rates.  
It’s lifetime Class A mishap rate was 4.64 (Air Force Safety Center, 2002).  The F-4’s 
removal should make for a safer mix of aircraft and reduce mishap rates overall.   
 More data needs to be collected and more studies need to be accomplished on the 
subject of aircraft mix and its affects on flying safety.  It is assumed that modern 
airframes are better designed, have more advanced systems, and more reliable 
manufacturing processes.  These advancements are likely to have contributed greatly to 
the historical reduction in the AF’s and Army’s mishap rates, although to what degree is 
unknown.  One might assume that today’s modern aircraft mix would contribute towards 
driving down mishap rates.  The issue of ageing aircraft, which is a topic of study unto 
itself, must also be considered.  Many of the AF’s airframes have been in service for 
decades.  It seems logical that as an aircraft ages, it would eventually become less 
reliable, and could ultimately contribute to a mishap.  The small proportion of parts and 
manufacture related mishaps, however, does not point to this area as a serious threat. 
  Personnel. 
 Human factors contribute to the majority of Class A mishaps.  We must therefore 
consider the historical makeup of the personnel involved in aviation mishaps.  
Specifically involved in an aviation mishap are pilots, maintenance personnel, and 
supervisors.   
 Pilot retention problems are well known in the AF.  It seems logical that if the AF 
were losing pilots to the civilian sector, she would be forced to hire new ones, driving the 
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overall experience level and age of the pilot pool down.  If this were the case, it would 
seem likely that mishap rates might increase, since youth and inexperience are logically 
linked with an increased likelihood of mishaps.  Analysis of pilot data however, which is 
discussed in greater detail later in this chapter, shows that the pilot pool is in fact getting 
older and more experienced, which would lend itself to a decreased likelihood of 
mishaps. 
 The aircraft maintenance field is experiencing its own retention problems.  A 
RAND Corporation study conducted in 2002 revealed that authorizations for enlisted 
aircraft maintenance personnel fell by 12.5 percent.   And while fill rates of basic 
apprentice level crew chief maintainers (3-Levels) rose to 134 percent and supervisor 
crew chiefs (7-Levels) rose to 111 percent, mid-level technicians (5-Levels) fell to 75 
percent.  (Dahlman and others, 2002).  This overall reduction, most notably in well-
trained, mid-level technicians could contribute to an increase in maintenance related 
mishaps.  However, this would be a very minor contribution, since only 4.7% of mishaps 
are maintenance related over the last ten years (Air Force Safety Center, 2003b) 
 Maturation. 
 Dooley defines maturation as a time threat to internal validity in which the 
internal processes of the experiment cause any observed changes (Dooley, 2001).  In this 
case, it refers to the development of the pilot throughout their flying careers.  Maturation 
is a threat to validity in this experiment due to the prevention programs utilized by the 
services, training, safer technology, and general experience.  Since ORM was designed to 
reduce mishaps, one may assume that over time, the subjects individually and as a whole 
would achieve greater understanding of risk management principles and eventually 
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reduce their likelihood of being involved in a mishap.  This would serve to drive down 
mishap rates over time. 
 Conversely, over time, older, experienced pilots are removed from flight status 
and are replaced with new, inexperienced ones, presumably resulting in a steady 
demographic population.  The previously discussed maturation effects would be 
consequently nullified.  Analysis of mishap demographics, however, indicates that since 
1996, the sample population got older and more experienced, which would seem to 
contribute to a decrease in mishaps.   
Mortality. 
Mortality refers to the loss of test subjects due to any number of reasons, 
including death and voluntary removal from the sample (Dooley, 2001).  Unfortunately, 
since many of the aviation mishaps studied in this research involve pilot fatalities, 
mortality is indeed a threat.  It is possible that such incidents may also relate to the 
maturation concept.  Mortality involves the removal and eventual replacement of a pilot 
whose attrition was most likely the result, at least in part, of human error.  If an aviator 
were removed from the sample in this manner, it would, in effect, raise the overall level 
of safety for the remaining sample and could minutely lower the likelihood of future 
mishaps and consequently lower subsequent mishap rates.  Over time, this threat could 
theoretically be responsible for the gradual reduction of risk.  Additionally, retention 
problems driven by lucrative civilian flying jobs contribute to test subject attrition. 
 Instrumentation. 
 
 Instrumentation threats occur when there are shifts in the methods in which data is 
collected (Dooley, 2001).  Changes in such methods are likely to adversely affect the 
47 
validity of the measured result.  Minor instrumentation threats are evident in this research 
as the criteria for mishap classification C was modified for dollars lost slightly in 2000.  
The classification adjustment was minor and would not significantly change the affected 
rates.  An additional confound was noted and studied by Ashley.  Previous to 1983, the 
Army included Flight-related mishaps along with Flight mishaps in its rate calculations.  
Ashley studied the confound, concluding that the change in instrumentation was not a 
significant factor affecting mishap rates. 
Test Reactivity. 
 Test Reactivity refers to a change in the subject’s behavior after being exposed to 
an initial pretest (Dooley, 2001).  It is likely that subjects would learn from any such 
pretest and it would adversely affect the results of the primary test.  Test reactivity is not 
considered a threat in this research because pretests were not conducted. 
Group Threats 
 Group threats are alternate explanations of an observed phenomenon caused by 
differences between studied groups rather than the treatment applied by the researcher 
(Dooley, 2000).  Creating equivalent groups prior to experimentation alleviates these 
threats.  In this experiment, however, we are unable to form a control group, and some 
threats must therefore be considered.   
 Two notable threats arise when a control group is not available.  The first threat is 
that the sample does not adequately represent its parent population.  In this case, 
however, the sample under scrutiny is the entire population of Air Force and Army 
aviators and is therefore a complete representation of the parent population.  The second 
threat is that the demographics of the population may have shifted over time.  It is 
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possible that over time, sample demographics such as age and experience may have 
changed.  To study this possibility, an analysis of mishap demographic data before and 
after ORM implementation was conducted.  The mean age of aircrew involved in Class A 
and B mishaps prior to 1996 was 30.61 years.  This increased to 31.88 years for mishaps 
after 1996.  Additionally, the mean flight hours of experience prior to 1996 was 1739.19 
hours, which increased to 1894.30 hours.  The average post-ORM mishap, therefore, 
involved slightly older, more experienced aviators.  Due to the affects of maturations, 
older, more experienced pilots should not negatively affect mishap rates and should not 
have negatively skewed the results of the ORM program, unless of course, such pilots 
adopt a more cavalier approach towards safety. 
 Since these two threats do not appear to directly affect the population sample, 
group threats are not considered a threat to the validity of the research. 
Selection. 
 It is essential that the selection of the experimental groups be accomplished fairly 
and appropriately.  It is possible that selected groups may differ in certain regards prior to 
the experiment and this may pose a threat to internal validity.  Selection is a group 
internal validity threat defined by Dooley as “differences observed between groups at the 
end of the study existed prior to the intervention because of the way members were sorted 
into groups.”  (Dooley, 2001)  Since control over groups was not possible in this 
research, the entire group is being studied.  Selection, therefore, is not considered a 
threat. 
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Selection-By-Time-Interactions. 
 Selection-By-Time-Interactions refer to situations in which subjects with different 
chances of observing time related changes, such as maturation or history, are located 
within different groups (Dooley, 2001).  All Air Force and Army pilots and their mishap 
rates are being studied conjunctively in this research and are presumably exposed to very 
similar time related changes.  The selection-by-time-interaction threat is therefore 
considered minimal. 
Regression Towards the Mean. 
 Regression Towards the Mean is a group threat in which extremely high and low 
responses are grouped together and retested, gravitating towards the mean observation 
and subsequently resulting in less extreme results (Dooley, 2001).  In this case, statistical 
regression analysis is used to study data, and extreme mishap rates and data outliers are 
removed when appropriate.  For this reason, the regression towards the mean threat is 
considered minimal. 
Reverse Causation 
 A research design that measures a number of variables concurrently runs the risk 
of reverse causation, in which the cause and effect relationship of the variables is not 
properly determined and temporal precedence of the variables is not understood (Dooley, 
2001).  It is possible to determine correlations between such variables, but if a response 
variable were not set before a treatment variable was administered, reverse causation 
would be a threat.  In this case, ORM practices were implemented long after the rates of 
aviation mishaps were being monitored, and indeed, rates were already going down prior 
to ORM implementation.  Therefore it is not likely that ORM was implemented in 
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response to a change (up or down) in accident rates.   Additionally, the statistical 
methodology employed explicitly uses the temporal precedence of ORM through the use 
of piecewise linear regression.  Consequently, reverse causation is a mild threat to this 
research design. 
Statistical Inference Validity 
 Statistical inference validity is tested by inferential statistics, and is obtained when 
the likelihood that the findings of the experiment are due to mere chance can confidently 
be dismissed (Dooley, 2001).  It is possible that the results of an experiment are due to 
errors in data sampling, such as improper population sampling or a small data sample.  In 
this case, flight mishap statistics are the critical element of this research, and its validity 
as proper measurement data is clear.  Sample sizes are quite substantial when broken 
down into quarterly data.  Statistical inference validity is not considered a threat to this 
research. 
A possible source of error is that this research studies only failed sortie data 
(mishaps).  A more useful data source would be a database of both successful and failed 
sorties and their associated statistics.  It would be useful to compare the two populations 
and it would eliminate the threat of the successful sortie population being different than 
the failed population. 
Additionally, this research uses a combination of parametric and non-parametric 
data.  The methodologies used to analyze such data vary.  Where the delineation between 
parametric and non-parametric is not clear, both types of tests are used. 
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Time series data is also a possible source of validity threat.  Conversion of the 
time series data into a percentage period index and exponentially smoothed data 
alleviates the threats. 
External Validity 
 Whereas internal validity pertains to the relationships within an experimental 
study, external validity refers to the generalizability of the research’s findings to external 
populations, places, or times, and always involves the interaction of the treatment with 
some other factor  (Dooley, 2001).  Ashley’s determination that ORM would not reduce 
the Air Force’s mishap rate is an external extension of his findings of the Army’s 
program (Ashley, 1999).  Findings from this study would confirm the external validity of 
those findings to other populations; in this case, Air Force pilots.  A source that could be 
used to test the external validity of both Ashley’s conclusions and this research is the 
U.S. Navy mishap rates and RM program.  Findings from this study would not be 
generalizable to non-military aviation, however.  There are considerable differences 
between military flying and commercial or general aviation.  The inherent external 
validity threat in this case is disregarded, as this thesis is only concerned with findings 
pertinent to military aviation. 
A summary table of the threats to research validity is shown in Table 5. 
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Table 5.  Threats to Validity 
THREAT LEVEL DESCRIPTION/WORKAROUND 
History Medium Many unknown factors possibly involved/ 
Perform tests around suspected factors 
Maturation Medium Deviation towards safety after implementation/ 
None 
Mortality Medium Observations are often fatal/ 
Examined demographics 
Instrumentation Low Insignificant Class C data shift 
Selection Low Entire population 
Regression Low Outliers are not retested 
Testing Low No pretest to react to 
Reverse Causation Low Decrease in rates did not cause  ORM 
Statistical Inference 
Validity 
Low Data is non-parametric, small sample size, time 
series/ 
Use numerous tests, smooth times series data 
External Validity Low AF pilots are not the same as GA, commercial 
pilots/ 
NA; only care about military pilots 
 
Investigative Questions 
 
 The following section discusses the methodology of each of the five investigative 
questions. 
IQ.1:  What are the factors involved in an aviation mishap? 
This investigative question is answered in Chapter 2, Literature Review.  
IQ.2:  What is ORM and how is it implemented? 
 This investigative question is answered in Chapter 2, Literature Review. 
IQ.3:  Have mishaps rates changed significantly since ORM was implemented? 
 This statistical analysis sought to detect significant differences in the mishap rates 
before and after the implementation of RM programs.  The Air Force began its ORM 
program in 1996, so mishap rates from FY 1983 to 1996 were compared to those of FY 
1997 to 2002.  Ashley’s investigation determined that the Army showed no significant 
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improvement after 1987 when their similar program was implemented (Ashley, 1999).  A 
comparison using updated Army mishap rates from 1973 to 2002 was accomplished to 
validate his results.  To determine any significant changes, a number of comparison of 
means tests and comparison of variance tests were conducted. 
Comparison of Means. 
The methodology of this phase is based on comparisons of population means from 
small sample sizes, due to the relatively small number of data points (Anderson and 
others, 1999).  Three assumptions must be met to perform the comparison tests  (Devore, 
2000).  The first assumption is that both samples must be selected from populations with 
normal probability distributions.  The second is that the samples are independent and 
randomly selected.  The third is that the samples must be taken from populations with 
equal variances. 
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The first assumption was satisfied through an analysis of the residuals.  Residuals, 
as defined by Anderson and others, are the difference between the observed value of the 
mishap rate and the value predicted using the estimated regression equation (Anderson 
and others, 2000).  To determine residuals, a linear regression was performed using the 
mishap rate as the dependent variable and fiscal year as the independent variable.    
Results are shown in Appendices C, D, E, and F.  An analysis of the data residuals using 
the Kolmogorov-Smirnov (K-S) goodness of fit test verifies this requirement.  The K-S 
test is used to test the hypothesis that a sample comes from a particular distribution 
(normal in this case). The value of the K-S Z statistic is based on the largest absolute 
difference between the residual and the theoretical cumulative normal distributions.   
The second assumption is that the samples are independent and randomly selected 
from their populations.  To truly satisfy this assumption, it would be necessary to have 
access to comprehensive data from all flights—both successful sorties and failed sorties 
(mishaps).  Unfortunately, comprehensive data of this nature is not available, and we are 
left with only the failed sortie data.  However, this assumption was satisfied because the 
sample is composed of all available data points of the failed sorties for the population 
being studied.   
The third assumption is that the samples must be taken from populations with 
equal variances.  The mishap rates being studied are time series data, however, so a test 
of variances is not appropriate, and the methodology for comparing the means must be 
reevaluated.  To that end, the data was transformed using a percentage period index 
method and exponential smoothing, both of which are discussed later in the chapter.  
Once transformed, direct comparison of means is applicable. 
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  The mishap rates are a chronological sequence of observations on a single 
variable and can be therefore defined as time series data (Bowerman and O’Connell, 
1999).  Time series can be either stationary or non-stationary.  A time series is stationary 
if it fluctuates around a constant mean.  The studied mishap rates, however, do not 
fluctuate around a constant mean and are therefore considered non-stationary.  Non-
stationary time series must be transformed into stationary time series before comparisons 
of means may be performed.  
 Percentage Period Index Transformation. 
 To transform the data into a stationary time series, the percentage period index 
(PPI) procedure used by Ashley (Ashley, 1999) and described by Makridakis was 
employed (Makridakis, 1983).  The PPI is a period-to-period percentage change 
measurement that enables the computation of testable means by converting the non-
stationary means into stationary PPI means.  Testing the differences of the PPI means 
will determine whether there was a significant difference after RM implementation. 
 The PPI transformation begins with setting the value of the first year’s mishap 
rate to a constant, C, in order to create an order of magnitude for the index.  PPIs for 
subsequent years are then calculated by determining the ratio of the current mishap rate to 
the previous year’s mishap rate and then multiplying the result by the selected constant.  
The PPI formula with a selected constant, C, of 10 are calculated as follows: 
PPI = [(Ratei + 1) / (Ratei)] x C  from i = 1 to n  (1) 
 Resulting tables of PPI values are included in Appendices G and H. 
 Once the mishap rates were transformed, comparisons of means tests were 
conducted.   
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Time Series Data Transformation:  Exponential Smoothing. 
A second transformation, known as exponential smoothing with trend adjustment, 
was used to adjust the time series data.  This algorithm works by smoothing out blips in 
the data while adjusting for a trend over time.  Smoothing the data set allows analysis that 
is less susceptible to the influence of extreme values.   
 This methodology creates a smoothed value (St) of the actual observation (At) by 
adjusting for trends (Tt).  Two smoothing constants, α and β, are applied in the 
formulation and can fall between 0.1 and 0.5.  The median of 0.3 for both values was 
chosen for this study.    
 The formula of the smoothed trend is: 
 
Tt  = β(St – St-1) + (1 - β)Tt-1  (2) 
 
The formula of the smoothed value is: 
St  = α(At) + (1 - α)(St-1 – Tt-1) (3) 
 
 The calculated smoothed values replace the original rates and are then analyzed 
using comparison of means tests explained hereafter.  The exponential smoothing values 
are shown in Appendices O and P. 
Test Descriptions. 
To determine whether there was a statistically significant difference in means 
before and after implementation, a number of tests were conducted using the SPSS 8.0 
statistics package.  To illustrate the differences between the raw mishap rates, trend 
adjusted PPI rates, and moving average adjusted rates, tests were conducted on all three 
sets of data.  A simple examination of means of the actual rates showed decreases in 3 of 
the 4 data categories studied, as shown in Table 6.   
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Table 6.  Mishap Rate Simple Means Comparisons 
  Pre-ORM Post-ORM Trend 
AF Class A 1.543 1.294 Decrease
AF Class B 0.549 1.99 Increase 
Army Class A 2.873 1.639 Decrease
Army Class B-C 13.481 7.306 Decrease
 
 
A series of charts showing these rates, adjusted PPI rates, and moving average 
rates over the examined time period and results from the tests will be shown in Chapter 4.   
Parametric Tests. 
 The first two tests, ANOVA and T-Tests are parametric tests.  They rely on the 
assumption that the samples come from populations that follow a normal distribution and 
are from a continuous interval or ratio scale (Devore, 2000).  While it is not appropriate 
to test the normality of the actual mishap rates, analysis of the data residuals showed that 
they were from approximately normal distributions (Appendices C-F).  Additionally, 
mishap rates are continuous interval scalar values.  Therefore, parametric tests may be 
appropriate. 
ANOVA. 
 ANOVA tests compare means of different samples through analysis of variance.  
The test statistic for ANOVA tests is the F-statistic.  The F-statistic is computed by 
dividing the mean square due to treatments by the mean square due to error.  The F-
statistic is compared to a critical F-value to yield a p-value.  Large F statistics yield small 
p-values, which must be less than the test’s alpha value to reject the null hypothesis at the 
desired confidence level (Devore, 2000). 
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T-Test. 
 The T-test is used to determine statistically significant differences in the means of 
two groups.  The test calculates a t-value by dividing the difference in means between the 
two groups by its standard error.  Large t-values result in small p-values (Devore, 2000). 
Non-Parametric Tests. 
 The remaining two tests, the Mann Whitney Test and the Wilcoxon Sign-Rank 
Test, are non-parametric, which alleviates the requirement for sample normality and 
continuous interval values (Devore, 2000).  Due to the difficulties of defining time series 
mishap rate data, these non-parametric tests were used as an additional, independent 
check on the validity of inferences drawn from the parametric tests. 
Mann Whitney Test. 
 The Mann Whitney test is used to determine statistically significant differences in 
the means of two groups.  This test is used for non-parametric populations, useful when 
standard assumptions about population distributions are not applicable (Devore, 2000).  
The test statistic for the Mann Whitney test is the U statistic, with large values yielding 
small p-values.  
Wilcoxon Sign-Rank Test. 
 The Wilcoxon Sign-Rank Test is used to determine statistically significant 
differences in the means of two groups.  It is used for non-parametric populations 
(Devore, 2000). 
Comparison of Variances. 
 The comparison of variances, like the comparison of means, is problematic when 
using time series data.  To compare variances of the mishap rates appropriately, an 
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analysis of the residuals of the mishap rates when regressed against the fiscal year may be 
conducted.  Changes in the variances of the samples from before and after 
implementation may indicate that a process change had occurred.  A simple glance of the 
mishap rate charts in Chapter 4 (Figure 23) shows a considerable amount of variance for 
the Army data, but is inconclusive when looking at the AF data.  The AF Class A data 
seems to consistently vary from year to year, while the Class B data fluctuates 
considerably.  Statistical tests of the residuals will yield more definitive answers. 
 When comparing variances of two samples, inferences may be made from the 
ratio of the variances.  The null hypothesis is rejected when the ratio is compared to an F-
value based on the size of the samples, yielding a small enough p-value (Anderson and 
others, 1999).  The F-statistic, which is the ratio, is computed by placing the larger 
variance as the numerator and the smaller variance as the denominator.  The critical F-
value to which the F-statistic is compared is determined based on the degrees of freedom 
of the sample.  When the variances are statistically the same, the null hypothesis is not 
rejected and we may not therefore conclude that any process change has occurred since 
implementation of ORM.  The hypotheses were: 
   Ho:  The residual variances are equal. 
   Ha:  The residual variances are not equal. 
This is a two-tailed test, so with an alpha value set at 0.05, the null is rejected with a p-
value of 0.025 or smaller.   
IQ.4:  Are any differences caused by ORM? 
 To determine whether any rate changes were caused by the implementation of 
ORM, a statistical technique utilized in Ashley’s thesis (Ashley, 1996) known as 
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discontinuous piecewise linear regression was performed.  Discontinuous piecewise 
linear regression determines whether a slope or intercept change is present at a selected 
point in time (Neter and others, 1996). 
 A two variable model with a breakpoint at C is described as: 
E(MR) = β0 + β1*X1 + β2*(X1 – C)*X2 + β3*X2 (4) 
where β0 is the Y-axis intercept, β1 is the slope of the line for the period prior to the 
treatment at breakpoint C, β1 + β2 is the slope of the line after C, and β3 is the jump in the 
intercept at C.  Figure 3 shows the concept. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.  Discontinuous Piecewise Linear Regression Response Function 
(Neter and Others, 1996) 
 
 
 If no significant change in the slope of the regression were to occur at point C, 
then the two lines would have the same slope.  In this case, one would expect the value of 
β2 to be zero and for both lines to have a slope of β1.  If no significant shift at the 
intercept at point C were to occur, one would expect the value of β3 to be zero. 
 With the successful implementation of the ORM treatment, one would expect to 
see significant changes while using these statistical procedures.  An effective treatment 
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would yield a decreasing shift in slope and/or a decrease at the intercept at C.  A shift at 
the intercept without a change in slope, or, conversely, a change in slope without a shift 
at the intercept could identify whether the treatment forced a process change (Campbell, 
1963).  As the AF implemented ORM in 1996, one would expect to see a downward shift 
at C or a decreasingly negative slope of the regression line after 1996. 
 The model consists of two variables:  fiscal year (FY) and operational risk 
management (RM).  Years prior to 1996 had an RM value of 0 and years after 1996 had 
an RM value of 1.  The breakpoint, C, is 1996.  The full model is: 
E(MR) = β0 + β1*FY + β2*(FY – 96)*RM + β3*RM  (5) 
where β0 is the Y-axis intercept, β1  is the slope of the regression line for the period prior 
to 1996, and β3 is the shift in the intercept at C, between 1996 and 1997.   
 Hypotheses for the analysis were as follows: 
  Ho:  β1 = β2 = β3 = 0 
  Ha:  The β values are ≠ 0. 
The value of the β1 and β3 terms are determined directly from their p-values resulting 
from the overall F-tests of the full model.  A partial F-test must be conducted on the 
reduced model to determine the value of β2.  The partial F-test had the following 
hypotheses: 
  Ho:  β2 = β3 = 0 
  Ha:  β2 = 0 or β3 = 0, but not both 
To determine if the slopes of the pre- and post-ORM regression lines are significantly 
different from each other, results of the partial F-test are analyzed.  If the value of β2 is 
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zero, then the slope of the second line will not be significantly different from the slope of 
the first.  The resulting hypothesis was: 
  Ho:  β2 = 0 
  Ha:  β2 ≠ 0 
 These tests and hypotheses were applied to AF Class A and B rates as well as 
Army Class A and B/C rates.  The breakpoint, C, for Army data was 1987, the year RM 
was implemented in the Army.  All tests were conducted using an alpha level of 
significance equal to 0.05. 
IQ.5:  Has the proportion of human factor related mishaps decreased since 
implementation? 
As ORM was intended to instill an atmosphere of safety in all AF personnel, one 
would expect to see a reduction in the proportion of human factors, and particularly those 
directly affected by ORM.  In this way, the experimental design would protect our results 
from the effects of non-ORM factor changes.  To study this expectation, mishap causal 
count data was analyzed using the chi-square goodness of fit test for Class A and B data 
for both the AF and Army human factors mishaps. 
 Chi-Square Goodness of Fit Test. 
The chi-square goodness of fit test is an upper-tailed, non-parametric test used to 
identify differences in observed and expected population behavior (Devore, 2000).   Each 
category (k) being observed is assigned an expected proportion.  In this case, only human 
factors cause categories, such as accepted risk, discipline, and emotional states were 
included.  The test compares the proportion of actual observed instances of such causes 
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after implementation to a proportion based on historical averages prior to 
implementation.    
The hypotheses are as follows: 
Ho:  The population follows a multinomial probability distribution with 
specified probabilities for each of k categories. 
Ha:  The population does not follow a multinomial probability distribution 
with specified probabilities for each of k categories. 
The test statistic is the chi-square, or χ2, and incorporates the observed 
frequencies (f) and expected frequencies (e) of each of k categories.  The test uses k-1 
degrees of freedom and a level of significance of 0.05.  The χ2 term is shown as:   
χ
2
1
k
i
fi ei−( )
ei
∑
=  (6) 
If the test statistic is shown to be less than the critical value given a level of 
significance of 0.05 and k-1 degrees of freedom, we accept the null hypothesis that the 
expected proportions are followed.  The results of this test may provide insight into the 
efficacy of ORM implementation by revealing any changes in the proportion of human 
factors related mishaps.   
Summary 
 
This chapter explained the methodology used to answer the research question.  It 
began by describing the research design as a quasi-experimental time-series experiment.  
A description of the various threats to validity was presented.  Finally, the methodology 
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utilized to answer the investigative questions was then described.  Analysis and results of 
the investigative methodologies are presented in the next chapter. 
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IV.  Analysis and Results 
 
 
Chapter Overview 
 
 The purpose of this chapter is to answer the overall research question by 
answering the five investigative questions posed in Chapter 1.  For each investigative 
question the problem is restated, relevant data is described, and answers are presented 
according to the methodology described in Chapter 3. 
 The analysis of investigative questions 3 and 4 ultimately allows us to identify 
differences in the mishap rates contemporaneous with RM and ORM implementation.  
Investigative question 5 would discern whether the changes were also contemporaneous 
with changes in human factors causes.  The results of the questions would provide strong 
circumstantial evidence that ORM and RM did or did not cause reductions in mishap 
rates and that it may be associated with any decreases or increases. 
IQ.1:  What factors are involved in an aviation mishap? 
Aviation mishaps are caused by an endless list of causes such as human error, 
weather, bird strikes, faulty parts, etc.  All such causes can be classified into one of four 
primary mishap causal factors:  human factors, environmental, material failure, or other.  
These four factors, either alone or in conjunction with each other, cause aviation mishaps. 
IQ.2:   What is ORM and how is it implemented? 
 ORM is a system implemented by the Air Force in an effort to increase safety.  It 
was designed as a decision-making process that identifies risk, evaluates courses of 
action, and determine the most beneficial course of action for any possible situation, on- 
or off-duty.  It was implemented in Sep 96 and was fully integrated through AF-wide 
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computer training by Oct 98.  Its implementation relies on commander leadership and 
individual adherence to its fundamental principles. 
IQ.3:  Have mishap rates changed significantly since the implementation of ORM 
practices? 
Data. 
 
 The data set being used to conduct the AF comparison of means tests are Class A 
and Class B mishap rates from 1983 to 2002 collected from the Air Force Safety Center 
online database.  PPI rates and moving average rates calculated from the true rates are 
also analyzed in the tests.  The Army tests use Class A and Class B-C mishap, PPI, and 
exponential smoothing rates from 1973 to 2002, initially collected from the Army Safety 
Center online database.  The Class B-C mishap rate is a combination of Class B and 
Class C mishaps, as provided by the Safety Center (Army Safety Center, 2002).  SPSS 
and Excel were used to run the four tests.  The outputs from the tests can be found in 
Appendices K-P.   
  AF Data Charts. 
The following series of charts illustrates the three sets of AF mishap data:  mishap 
rates, PPI rates, and exponential smoothing rates for Air Force Class A and B mishaps.  
The first chart (Figure 4) shows basic mishap rates as gleaned from the AFSC website 
data.  Embedded trend lines indicate a slight but steady decrease in Class A rates.   Class 
B rates were holding steady under 1.00 mishap per 100,000 flying hours until a dramatic 
spike occurred in 1999 and beyond. 
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Figure 4.  AF Mishap Rates 
 
 
 This second chart (Figure 5) illustrates the transformation of the basic rates into 
the PPI.  As the non-stationary time-series mishap rates are anchored around a constant of 
10, the once declining or steady trend lines begin to incline slightly.  Pre-ORM PPI 
values, as indicated by their trend lines, are almost steady, with only a slight increase.  
Post-ORM values continue those trends with no visible change. 
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Figure 5.  AF PPI Values 
 
 The third chart (Figure 6) shows the basic mishap rates transformed using 
exponential smoothing.  Trend lines for these values indicate that the mishap rate for 
Class A was declining, but leveled off over the post-ORM years.  Class B exponentially 
smoothed rates show a decrease until the start of the 1990’s, when rates began to 
increase.  A comparison of the pre- and post-ORM years for Class B indicates an increase 
since ORM was introduced. 
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AF Exponential Smoothing Values
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Figure 6.  AF Exponential Smoothing Rates 
 
 
  Army Data Charts. 
 
 The next three charts display Army mishap data from 1973 to present.  The charts 
show basic mishap rates, PPI rates, and exponentially smoothed rates for Class A and 
Class B-C mishaps.  The first chart (Figure 7) illustrates the overall declining trends for 
both Class A and B-C basic mishap rates.  A rudimentary glance at the chart indicates 
that class B-C rates seemed to have increased after RM was implemented in 1987. 
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Figure 7.  Army Mishap Rates 
 
 
 The second chart (Figure 8) shows the data after being transformed using the PPI 
procedure.  Pre-RM values no longer show any discernable decrease, and the Class A 
trend actually increased after RM implementation. 
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Figure 8.  Army PPI Values 
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 The third chart (Figure 9) shows the Army’s mishaps rate after the application of 
exponential smoothing.  Trends continue to follow the same pattern as the basic mishap 
rates.  The most notable trend is the B-C rate increasing in the post-RM years. 
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Figure 9.  Army Exponential Smoothing 
 
 
Results. 
 
 To determine whether the implementation of ORM had any effect on mishap 
rates, a series of comparison of means tests were conducted on a variety of data types.  
The tests analyzed whether the means of the mishap rates before ORM implementation 
differed from mishap rates after ORM implementation.  Three data rates were analyzed; 
mishap rates, PPI values, and exponentially smoothed rates.  Two classes were analyzed; 
Class A and B for the Air Force and Class A and B-C for the Army.  The results are 
presented in the following section. 
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AF Comparison of Means Tests. 
The results of the four tests for the AF mishap rates are shown in Table 7.  
Parametric tests indicate that the pre- and post-ORM years have unequal means, while the 
non-parametric tests, which are less sensitive and more conservative, yield somewhat 
different results. 
Table 7.  AF Mishap Rate Comparison of Means 
  AF Class A AF Class B 
  P Reject? P Reject? 
ANOVA 0.012 Yes 0.005 Yes 
T-Test 0.015 Yes 0.057 No 
Mann-Whitney 0.036 No 0.043 No 
Wilcoxon 0.037 No 0.046 No 
 
 
The results of the four tests for the AF PPI values are shown in Table 8.  All tests 
results indicate that mean PPI values did not change after ORM. 
Table 8.  AF PPI Values Comparison of Means 
  AF Class A AF Class B 
  P Reject? P Reject? 
ANOVA 0.742 No 0.486 No 
T-Test 0.764 No 0.561 No 
Mann-Whitney 0.663 No 0.905 No 
Wilcoxon 0.699 No 0.938 No 
 
 
The results of the four tests for the AF exponentially smoothed rates are shown in 
Table 9.  Tests on Class A rates indicate that the sample means did not change.  Class B 
tests showed that means were equal. 
Table 9.  AF Exponential Smoothing Comparison of Means 
  AF Class A AF Class B 
  P Reject? P Reject? 
ANOVA 0.016 Yes 0.893 No  
T-Test 0 Yes 0.848 No  
Mann-Whitney 0.008 Yes 0.325 No  
Wilcoxon 0.006 Yes 0.347 No  
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The tests conducted on the raw mishap rates show a significant statistical 
difference between Class A rates after implementation of ORM when using parametric 
tests, but not when using the non-parametric tests.  The results indicate a possible change 
since implementation, and as the post-ORM mean is lower, it suggests that ORM did 
have its desired effect on the rates.  Class B rates do not clearly show differences, 
although the P-values are very close to the rejection region.  Due to the difficulties with 
the comparison of time-series data rates, the PPI tests were then conducted to yield more 
information.   
 Once trends are smoothed out using the PPI procedure, the statistical tests show 
no significant differences in the PPI means before and after ORM implementation.  All 
four tests yielded p-values greater than the test level of significance of 0.05.  Therefore, 
the tests do not reject the null hypothesis that the means are equal, and we cannot say that 
ORM implementation has reduced the rate of mishaps within the Air Force. 
 Tests conducted on the exponentially smoothed mishap rates contradict the 
previous findings.  Class A tests unanimously rejected the null, indicating that the pre- 
and post-ORM means were not equal, and that a significant rate change had occurred, 
again suggesting a desired ORM effect.  Class B tests followed the previous PPI tests by 
showing that the means were equal and statistically unchanged. 
 Overall, the Class A tests yielded contradictory results.  While several of the tests 
showed a decreasing mean, the most reliable set of data, the PPI-transformed data, did 
not show a significant change.  Clearly, a more expansive investigation of the rates is 
necessary.  
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Only one of the twelve tests indicated a change in the means of Class B data--the 
ANOVA conducted on the annual mishap data.  These results do not indicate a change of 
means, suggesting that the implementation did not affect mishap rates.  However, 
examination of the Figures 4 and 6 clearly indicate Class B data has taken a dramatic 
upswing within the last decade or so.  Another glaring problem with these results is the 
considerable spike that happened in the late 70’s, which would most likely skew the tests.  
Tests were therefore rerun on the Class B data with the abnormal years removed to 
compare results.  This time the test rejected the null, indicating the means were not equal, 
and that rates had significantly increased since implementation.   Since none of the results 
indicated that ORM was having its desired effect, more analysis using more sophisticated 
techniques was clearly needed.  
Army Comparison of Means Tests. 
 The results of the four tests for the Army mishap rates are shown in Table 10.  
Results from these tests indicate that the pre- and post-RM means were not equal. 
Table 10.  Army Mishap Rates Comparison of Means 
  Army Class A Army Class B-C 
  P Reject? P Reject? 
ANOVA 0 Yes 0.001 Yes 
T-Test 0 Yes 0.001 Yes 
Mann-Whitney 0 Yes 0.017 Yes 
Wilcoxon 0 Yes 0.016 Yes 
 
The results of the four tests for the Army PPI values are shown in Table 11.  Tests 
on the PPI values unanimously indicate that the rates from pre- and post-RM had not 
significantly changed. 
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Table 11.  Army PPI Values Comparison of Means 
  Army Class A Army Class B-C 
  P Reject? P Reject? 
ANOVA 0.486 No 0.18 No 
T-Test 0.49 No 0.185 No 
Mann-Whitney 0.678 No 0.431 No 
Wilcoxon 0.683 No 0.436 No 
 
The results of the four tests for the Army exponential smoothing rates are shown 
in Table 12.  The tests results unanimously indicate different means for pre- and post-RM 
rates. 
Table 12.  Army Exponential Smoothing Comparison of Means 
  Army Class A Army Class B-C 
  P Reject? P Reject? 
ANOVA 0 Yes 0 Yes 
T-Test 0 Yes 0 Yes 
Mann-Whitney 0 Yes 0 Yes 
Wilcoxon 0 Yes 0 Yes 
 
The tests conducted on the Army’s raw mishap rates for both A and B-C classes 
show a significant difference between pre- and post-implementation of RM.  Analysis of 
the PPI rates, however, yields different results. All four tests fail to reject the null 
hypothesis that the means are equal, indicating that the Army did not see a reduction in 
mishap rates after RM implementation.  Conversely, the exponential rates tests yielded 
the opposite answer.  All of the tests for both Class A and B-C yielded significances well 
within the rejection region, strongly indicating unequal means. 
Comparison of Variances Tests. 
 The results of the four comparison of variance tests are summarized in Table 13 
and the analysis can be found in Appendices Q and R.  If the resultant F-statistic is 
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greater than the F-critical value, we may conclude that the variances are equal and no 
process change is likely to have occurred. 
Table 13.  Comparison of Variance Results 
 Class F-stat F-crit Reject Null? 
A 1.703 2.92 No 
AF B 7.9 2.92 Yes 
A 3.936 2.53 Yes 
Army B-C 0.765 2.48 No 
 
The analysis of the residuals yielded varying results.  AF Class A residual variance were 
equal and did not show a process change from pre-ORM to post-ORM, while Class B 
residuals did.  Conversely, Class A residual variance for the Army were not equal, 
indicating a possible change, while the Class B-C residual variance were statistically 
equal. 
Summary. 
This investigative question sought to determine whether implementation of ORM 
had any significant effect on aviation mishap rates.  Due to the problematic nature of 
time-series data, both parametric and non-parametric tests were used to compare the 
means of pre-ORM implementation mishap rates and post-implementation mishap rates.  
The results were not conclusive.  While several tests conducted on mishap rates and 
exponentially smoothed rates showed a difference between pre- and post-ORM 
implementation, analysis of the PPI values clearly indicated that there was no difference.  
Based on these results, we cannot clearly state whether mishap rates changed or remained 
the same after ORM was implemented.  However, since the PPI values remove the 
problems associated with time series data means comparisons, the PPI results are the 
most reliable. 
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The tests conducted on the Army data yielded similarly conflicting results.  Tests 
on mishap rates and exponentially smoothed rates showed clearly that the rates had 
changed after implementation of their RM program.  However, the same tests conducted 
on transformed PPI values said just the opposite; that the rates had not changed. 
Analysis of the variance of the residuals of mishap rates regressed against fiscal 
year yielded varying results, indicating a possible process change within the data.  An 
ORM induced change may not be discounted at this point and further analysis is required. 
IQ.4:   Are any changes caused by ORM? 
 
To determine whether rate changes were due to the implementation of ORM, 
discontinuous piecewise linear regression was used on a number of data sets from both 
the Air Force and Army.  This statistical technique measures changes in slope and linear 
shifts around a breakpoint, the date of ORM implementation.   
Data. 
The tests were run on several data sets, as outlined in Table 14.  The AFSC 
provided monthly flying hours and sorties flown, enabling the development of quarterly 
mishap and sortie rates for additional analysis.  The quarterly mishap and sortie rates 
were calculated as the number of mishaps per 100,000 flying hours or 100,000 sorties 
flown.  Army quarterly data was unavailable. 
Table 14.  Regression Data Sets 
 Annual Rates Quarterly 
Mishap Rates 
Quarterly 
 Sortie Rates 
Air Force A, B A, B A, B 
Army A, B-C NA NA 
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 Air Force Results. 
 
  AF Class A Annual Rates. 
 
 The AF Class A annual mishap rates are illustrated in Figure 10.  The time 
periods were 1970 to 1996 for the pre-ORM years and 1997 to 2002 for the post-ORM 
years.  The chart shows the two periods with the breakpoint, C, at 1996 along with 
associated regression lines. 
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Figure 10.  AF Class A Annual Mishap Rates 
 
 
 Tables 15 and 16 show the results of the discontinuous piecewise linear regression 
tests for AF Class A annual mishap data. 
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Table 15.  AF Class A Annual Overall F Test-Results 
Term Beta
Beta 
Coefficient P-Value 
Reject 
Null?
Equal 
0? 
Y Intercept β0  8.801 0.000 NA NA 
FY β1  -0.080 0.000 Yes No 
(FY-96)RM β2  0.090 0.216 NA NA 
RM β3  0.175 0.562 No Yes 
 
 
Table 16.  AF Class A Annual Partial F-Test Results 
SSE SSR F Stat F Crit Reject Null? β2 = β3 = 0 
2.258 0.69 3.97254 4.25 No Yes 
 
 
The overall F-tests indicate that the slope of the pre-ORM line, β1, is significantly 
different from zero, and that there was no significant shift at the breakpoint at 1996.  The 
partial F-Test does not reject the null hypothesis that both β2 and β3  equal zero.  This 
indicates that β2 is not significantly different from zero and therefore the line after the 
breakpoint is not significantly different from the line prior to the breakpoint. 
 Since there was no shift in the regression line in 1996 and the slopes of the two 
lines are not significantly different, there is no evidence that the implementation of ORM 
affected the AF Class A Annual mishap rates. 
  AF Class A Quarterly Mishap Rates. 
 
 The AF Class A quarterly mishap rates are illustrated in Figure 11. 
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Figure 11.  AF Class A Quarterly Mishap Rates 
 
 
Tables 17 and 18 show the results of the discontinuous piecewise linear regression 
tests for AF Class A quarterly mishap data. 
Table 17.  AF Class A Quarterly Overall F Test-Results 
Term Beta
Beta 
Coefficient P-Value 
Reject 
Null?
Equal 
0? 
Y Intercept β0  3.376 0.000 NA NA 
FY β1  -0.020 0.000 Yes No 
(FY-96)RM β2  0.041 0.019 Yes No 
RM β3  0.176 0.497 No Yes 
 
 
Table 18.  AF Class A Quarterly Partial F-Test Results 
SSE SSR F Stat F Crit Reject Null? β2 = β3 = 0 
41.663 5.938 8.694 3.800 Yes No 
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The overall F-tests indicate that the slope of the pre-ORM line, β1, is significantly 
different from zero, and that there was no significant shift at the breakpoint at 1996.  The 
partial F-Test rejects the null hypothesis that both β2 and β3  equal zero.  Since β3  was 
previously shown to equal zero, this indicates that β2 is significantly different from zero 
and therefore the line after the breakpoint is significantly different from the line prior to 
the breakpoint. 
 While there was no shift in the regression line in 1996, the slopes of the two lines 
are significantly different, and there is evidence that the implementation of ORM affected 
the AF Class A Quarterly mishap rates by creating a process change.  However, since the 
slope of the first line is decreasing and the slope of the second line is increasing, it 
appears ORM did not have its desired effect of reducing rates. 
AF Class A Quarterly Sortie Mishap Rates. 
 
 The AF Class A quarterly sortie mishap rates are illustrated in Figure 12. 
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Figure 12.  AF Class A Quarterly Sortie Mishap Rates 
 
 
Tables 19 and 20 show the results of the discontinuous piecewise linear regression 
tests for AF Class A quarterly sortie mishap data. 
Table 19.  AF Class A Quarterly Sortie Overall F Test-Results 
Term Beta
Beta 
Coefficient P-Value 
Reject 
Null?
Equal 
0? 
Y Intercept β0  6.403 0.000 NA NA 
FY β1  -0.040 0.000 Yes No 
(FY-96)RM β2  0.092 0.011 Yes No 
RM β3  0.460 0.389 No Yes 
 
 
Table 20.  AF Class A Quarterly Sortie Partial F-Test Results 
SSE SSR F Stat F Crit Reject Null? β2 = β3 = 0 
175.425 31.291 10.881 3.800 Yes No 
 
 
The overall F-tests indicate that the slope of the pre-ORM line, β1, is significantly 
different from zero, and that there was no significant shift at the breakpoint at 1996.  The 
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partial F-Test rejects the null hypothesis that both β2 and β3  equal zero.  Since β3  was 
previously shown to be equal to zero, β2 is therefore shown to be not equal to zero.  This 
indicates that the line after the breakpoint is significantly different from the line prior to 
the breakpoint. 
 While there was no shift in the regression line in 1996, the slopes of the two lines 
are significantly different.  We may therefore conclude that the implementation of ORM 
affected quarterly sortie mishap rates by creating a process change.  However, because 
the slope of the first line is decreasing (negative) and the slope of the second line is 
increasing (positive), we cannot conclude that ORM had the desired affect of reducing 
rates. 
 AF Class A Operational Causes. 
 
 This final Class A analysis examines only operational causes, or mishaps caused 
by pilot related factors only.  Figure 13 shows the number of Class A mishaps with 
operational causes since 1991. 
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Figure 13.  AF Class A Operational Causes 
 
 
Tables 21 and 22 show the results of the discontinuous piecewise linear regression 
tests. 
Table 21.  AF Class A Operational Causes Overall F-Test Results 
Term Beta
Beta 
Coefficient P-Value 
Reject 
Null?
Equal 
0? 
Y Intercept β0  3607.467 0.182 NA NA 
FY β1  -1.800 0.184 No Yes 
(FY-96)RM β2  2.571 0.180 No Yes 
RM β3  -2.533 0.689 No Yes 
 
 
Table 22.  AF Class A Quarterly Sortie Partial F-Test Results 
SSE SSR F Stat F Crit Reject Null? β2 = β3 = 0 
241.552 59.000 1.10 6.06 No Yes 
 
 
The overall F-tests indicate that the slope of the pre-ORM line, β1, is not 
significantly different from zero, and that there was no significant shift at the breakpoint 
at 1996.  The partial F-Test does not reject the null hypothesis that both β2 and β3  equal 
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zero.  This indicates that the line after the breakpoint is not significantly different from 
the line prior to the breakpoint. 
 There was no shift in the regression line in 1996, and although the pre-ORM line 
decreased and the pot-ORM line increased, the slopes of the two lines are not 
significantly different.  We may therefore conclude that the implementation of ORM did 
not affect the number of operational mishap causes.  Moreover, because the slope of the 
first line is decreasing (negative) and the slope of the second line is increasing (positive), 
we cannot conclude that ORM had the desired affect of reducing rates. 
AF Class B Annual Mishap Rates. 
 
 The AF Class B annual mishap rates are illustrated in Figure 14.  It is interesting 
to note the substantial spike in Class B mishaps between 1976 and 1979.  It is unclear 
what caused the dramatic increase, which is mirrored in both the quarterly mishap and 
sortie analysis.  Analysis of the period showed no substantial changes in flying hours or 
sorties flown.  There were no major air campaigns being conducted at the time, with the 
Vietnam War ending in 1975.  The most substantial aircraft type suffering Class B 
mishaps at the time were F-4 variants, but it was not noticeably different than adjacent 
years.  More detailed research using more in-depth data would need to be conducted to 
learn more about the spike.   
86 
AF Class B Annual Mishap Rates
0.00
2.00
4.00
6.00
8.00
10.00
12.00
14.00
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
Year
M
is
ha
ps
 P
er
 1
00
,0
00
 F
lig
ht
 H
ou
rs
pre post Linear (pre) Linear (post)
 
Figure 14.  AF Class B Annual Mishap Rates 
 
 
Table 23 and 24 show the results of the discontinuous piecewise linear regression 
tests for AF Class B annual mishap data. 
Table 23.  AF Class B Annual Overall F Test-Results 
Term Beta
Beta 
Coefficient P-Value 
Reject 
Null?
Equal 
0? 
Y Intercept β0  14.565 0.040 NA NA 
FY β1  -0.153 0.066 No Yes 
(FY-96)RM β2  0.883 0.186 No Yes 
RM β3  -0.201 0.942 No Yes 
 
 
Table 24.  AF Class B Annual Partial F-Test Results 
SSE SSR F Stat F Crit Reject Null? β2 = β3 = 0 
189.164 31.510 2.165 4.250 No Yes 
 
 
The overall F-tests indicate that the slope of the pre-ORM line, β1, is not 
significantly different from zero, and that there was no significant shift at the breakpoint 
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at 1996.  The partial F-Test does not reject the null hypothesis that both β2 and β3  equal 
zero.  This indicates that β2 is not significantly different from zero and therefore the line 
after the breakpoint is not significantly different than the line prior to the breakpoint. 
 Since there was no shift in the regression line in 1996 and the slopes of the two 
lines are not significantly different, there is no evidence that the implementation of ORM 
affected the AF Class B Annual mishap rates. 
AF Class B Quarterly Mishap Rates. 
 
 The AF Class B quarterly mishap rates are illustrated in Figure 14. 
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Figure 15.  AF Class B Quarterly Mishap Rates 
 
 
Tables 25 and 26 show the results of the discontinuous piecewise linear regression 
tests for AF Class B quarterly mishap data. 
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Table 25.  AF Class B Quarterly Overall F Test-Results 
Term Beta
Beta 
Coefficient P-Value 
Reject 
Null?
Equal 
0? 
Y Intercept β0  3.133 0.000 NA NA 
FY β1  -0.028 0.003 Yes No 
(FY-96)RM β2  0.290 0.000 Yes No 
RM β3  0.018 0.988 No Yes 
 
 
Table 26.  AF Class B Quarterly Partial F-Test Results 
SSE SSR F Stat F Crit Reject Null? β2 = β3 = 0 
887.254 196.962 13.541 3.800 Yes No 
 
 
The overall F-tests indicate that the slope of the pre-ORM line, β1, is not 
significantly different from zero, and that there was no significant shift at the breakpoint 
at 1996.  The partial F-Test rejects the null hypothesis that both β2 and β3  equal zero.  
Since β3  was previously shown to be equal to zero, β2 is therefore not equal to zero.  This 
indicates that the line after the breakpoint is significantly different from the line prior to 
the breakpoint. 
 While there was no shift in the regression line in 1996, the slopes of the two lines 
are significantly different.  We may therefore conclude that the implementation of ORM 
occurred contemporaneously with an increase in the slope of Class B quarterly mishap 
rates, indicating a possible process change.  Because the slope of the first line is 
decreasing (negative) and the slope of the second line is increasing (positive), we cannot 
conclude that ORM had the desired affect of reducing rates. 
AF Class B Quarterly Sortie Mishap Rates. 
 
 The AF Class B quarterly sortie mishap rates are illustrated in Figure 15. 
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Figure 16.  AF Class B Quarterly Sortie Mishap Rates 
 
 
Tables 27 and 28 show the results of the discontinuous piecewise linear regression 
tests for AF Class B quarterly sortie mishap data. 
 
Table 27.  AF Class B Quarterly Sortie Overall F Test-Results 
Term Beta
Beta 
Coefficient P-Value 
Reject 
Null?
Equal 
0? 
Y Intercept β0  5.798 0.000 NA NA 
FY β1  -0.052 0.002 Yes No 
(FY-96)RM β2  0.572 0.281 No Yes 
RM β3  -0.073 0.973 No Yes 
 
 
Table 28.  AF Class B Quarterly Sortie Partial F-Test Results 
SSE SSR F Stat F Crit Reject Null? β2 = β3 = 0 
2976.084 751.462 15.403 3.800 Yes No 
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The overall F-tests indicate that the slope of the pre-ORM line, β1, is significantly 
different from zero, and that there was no significant shift at the breakpoint at 1996.  The 
partial F-Test rejects the null hypothesis that both β2 and β3  equal zero.  Since β3  was 
previously shown to be equal to zero, β2 is therefore not equal to zero.  This indicates that 
the line after the breakpoint is significantly different from the line prior to the breakpoint. 
 While there was no shift in the regression line in 1996, the slopes of the two lines 
are significantly different.  We may therefore conclude that the implementation of ORM 
occurred contemporaneously with an increase in the slope of Class B quarterly sortie 
mishap rates, indicating a possible process change.  Because the slope of the first line is 
decreasing (negative) and the slope of the second line is increasing (positive), we cannot 
conclude that ORM had the desired affect of reducing rates. 
  AF Class B Quarterly Mishap Rates Revisited. 
 
 Earlier analysis of AF Class B annual, quarterly, and sortie rates all indicate 
increased mishap rates after ORM implementation.  A closer examination of the data 
points revealed an interesting rate surge shortly after the implementation date, starting in 
1998.  As illustrated in Figure 17 below, the rates remained steady through the ORM 
implementation quarter (104) and did not begin to increase until July 1998 (quarter 112).  
The late 1970’s rate spike, which appears to be an anomaly of some sort, was avoided 
during this analysis. 
 
91 
AF Class B Quarterly Rates
0.000
1.000
2.000
3.000
4.000
5.000
6.000
7.000
8.000
39 49 59 69 79 89 99 109 119
Quarter
M
is
ha
ps
 P
er
 1
00
,0
00
 F
lig
ht
 H
ou
rs
pre post Linear (pre) Linear (post)
 
Figure 17.  AF Class B Quarterly Mishap Rates Revisited  
 
 
Examination of the trendlines reveals an obvious shift at the new breakpoint and 
an obvious increase in the slope of the lines.  Tables 29 and 30 show the results of the 
discontinuous piecewise linear regression tests for AF Class B quarterly sortie mishap 
data. 
 
Table 29.  AF Class B Quarterly (‘98) Overall F Test-Results 
Term Beta
Beta 
Coefficient P-Value
Reject 
Null?
Equal 
0? 
Y Intercept β0  1.021 0.004 NA NA 
FY β1  -0.004 0.339 No Yes 
(FY-98)Post  98 β2  0.092 0.055 No Yes 
Post 98 β3  3.591 0.000 Yes No 
 
 
Table 30.  AF Class B Quarterly (‘98) Partial F-Test Results 
SSE SSR F Stat F Crit Reject Null? β2 = β3 = 0 
51.053 132.982 106.796 3.890 Yes No 
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Using the resultant p-values, the F-tests indicate that the slope of the pre-1998 line, β1, is 
not significantly different from zero and that there was a significant jump at the 
breakpoint at July 1998.  The partial F-Test reveals that β2 is equal to zero and that the 
line after 1998 is not significantly different from the line prior to 1998. 
There was a significant shift in the regression line in 1998, but the slopes of the 
two lines are equal.  We conclude that some, unexplained event occurred 
contemporaneously with an increase in the slope of Class B quarterly sortie mishap rates, 
indicating a process change.  The slope of the first line is decreasing (negative) and the 
slope of the second line is increasing (positive).  These results may indicate events other 
than ORM are causing the observed rate changes.   
It is unclear why the AF Class B mishap rates suffered significant increases since 
1998.  The DoD changed its classification criteria slightly, but that occurred in 2002 and 
involved only Class C mishaps.  It is possible that a surge in operations tempo due to the 
Operation Allied Force in Kosovo led to the increases, but no such increases are evident 
during the Gulf War or the Vietnam War.  It is also possible that ORM has had a 
detrimental effect on safety. 
Army Results. 
 
Army Class A Annual Results. 
 
 Flying hours and sorties flown data was not available so no quarterly data sets 
were developed.  The Army Class A annual mishap rates are illustrated in Figure 18. 
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 Figure 18.  Army Class A Annual Mishap Rates 
 
 
Tables 31 and 32 show the results of the discontinuous piecewise linear regression 
tests for Army Class A annual mishap data.  Ashley noted very similar numbers in his 
analysis of the same data ending in 1999 (Ashley, 1999).  The only noticeable differences 
being that Ashley’s post-RM slope was slightly steeper and his breakpoint at C was 
slightly smaller.  These differences were fueled by a sharp rate increase after 2000. 
Table 31.  Army Class A Annual Overall F Test-Results 
Term Beta
Beta 
Coefficient P-Value 
Reject 
Null?
Equal 
0? 
Y Intercept β0  11.016 0.001 NA NA 
FY β1  -0.102 0.008 Yes No 
(FY-96)RM β2  0.045 0.373 No Yes 
RM β3  -0.116 0.794 No Yes 
 
 
Table 32.  Army Class A Annual Partial F-Test Results 
SSE SSR F Stat F Crit Reject Null? β2 = β3 = 0 
9.169 0.294 0.417 4.250 No Yes 
94 
 
 
The overall F-tests indicate that the slope of the pre-RM line, β1, is significantly different 
from zero, and that there was no significant shift at the breakpoint at 1996.  The partial F-
Test does not reject the null hypothesis that both β2 and β3  equal zero.  This indicates that 
β2 is not significantly different from zero and therefore the line after the breakpoint is not 
significantly different from the line prior to the breakpoint. 
 Since there was no shift in the regression line in 1996 and the slopes of the two 
lines are not significantly different, there is no evidence that the implementation of RM 
affected the Army Class A Annual mishap rates 
Army Class B-C Annual Results. 
 
The Army Class B-C annual mishap rates are illustrated in Figure 19. 
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Figure 19.  Army Class B-C Annual Mishap Rates 
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Tables 33 and 34 show the results of the discontinuous piecewise linear regression 
tests for Army Class B annual mishap data.  As with the Class A data, these results are 
very similar to Ashley’s findings (Ashley, 1999). 
Table 33.  Army Class B Annual Overall F Test-Results 
Term Beta
Beta 
Coefficient P-Value 
Reject 
Null?
Equal 
0? 
Y Intercept β0  112.543 0.000 NA NA 
FY β1  -1.202 0.000 Yes No 
(FY-96)RM β2  1.488 0.000 Yes No 
RM β3  -2.768 0.160 No Yes 
 
 
Table 34.  Army Class B Annual Partial F-Test Results 
SSE SSR F Stat F Crit Reject Null? β2 = β3 = 0 
172.672 310.562 23.381 4.250 Yes No 
 
 
The overall F-tests indicate that the slope of the pre-RM line, β1, is significantly different 
from zero, and that there was no significant shift at the breakpoint at 1987, when the 
Army officially implemented the program.  The partial F-Test rejects the null hypothesis 
that both β2 and β3  equal zero.  Since β3  was previously shown to be equal to zero, β2 is 
therefore not equal to zero.  This indicates that the line after the breakpoint is 
significantly different from the line prior to the breakpoint. 
 While there was no shift in the regression line in 1987, the slopes of the two lines 
are significantly different.  We may therefore conclude that the implementation of RM 
affected Army Class B annual mishap rates by creating a process change.  However, 
because the slope of the first line is decreasing (negative) and the slope of the second line 
is increasing (positive), we cannot conclude that RM had the desired affect of reducing 
rates. 
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  Regressions of Implementation Period. 
 
 The AF initiated the implementation of the ORM program in September 1996.  
That date was therefore chosen to be the breakpoint for the AF regression analyses.  It 
was noted earlier, however, that complete implementation of the program throughout the 
AF via computer training, was not accomplished until October 1998.  It is possible that 
any reduction in rates due to ORM would not be realized until training was complete.   
For this reason, another set of tests was performed on the AF data, this time with 
two breakpoints; one at September 1996 and another at October 1998.  This effectively 
broke the data set up into three sections; pre-ORM, training, and post-ORM.  The same 
discontinuous piecewise linear regression techniques were used on AF Class A and B 
quarterly mishap rates. 
   AF Class A Implementation Period Results. 
 AF Class A quarterly mishap rate data, segmented into the three periods are 
shown in Figure 20. 
97 
AF A Implementation Periods
0.000
0.500
1.000
1.500
2.000
2.500
3.000
3.500
4.000
4.500
5.000
0 20 40 60 80 100 120
Quarter
M
is
ha
ps
 p
er
 1
00
,0
00
 F
lig
ht
 H
ou
rs
1-102 103-112 113-126 Linear (1-102) Linear (103-112) Linear (113-126)
Figure 20.  AF Class A Implementation Period Quarterly Rates 
 
 
Table 35.  AF Class A Implementation Period Quarterly Results 
  β3 P-Value Reject Equal 0? F-Stat F-Crit Reject 
Period 1-2 -0.0207 0.948 No Yes 2.741 4.25 No 
Period 2-3 -0.032 0.503 No Yes 0.262 3.8 No 
 
 
Results from the tests, shown in Table 35, reveal that there were no significant 
shifts at either breakpoint and that the three lines did not have significantly different 
slopes.  It is clear upon examining the chart that the pre-ORM period had a downward 
sloping rate and that the implementation period had an upward sloping rate.  Partial F-
Tests on the data set revealed that while the implementation line did begin to increase, the 
difference was not statistically significant.  The lack of significance of the slope shifts are 
attributed to the relatively weaker strength of the smaller number of data points in the 
latter periods.  The rate line decreased from the implementation to post-ORM periods, 
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possibly indicating that the benefits of the program were starting to take effect.  However, 
overall, both rates were still increasing.   
   AF Class B Implementation Period. 
AF Class B quarterly mishap rate data, segmented into the three periods are 
shown in Figure 21. 
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Figure 21.  AF Class B Implementation Period Quarterly Rates 
 
 
Table 36.  AF Class B Implementation Period Quarterly Results 
  β3 P-Value Reject Equal 0? F-Stat F-Crit Reject 
Period 1-2 0.0946 0.775 No Yes 1.657 3.72 No 
Period 2-3 0.103 0.001 Yes No 7.167 4.32 Yes 
 
 
Test results, shown in Table 36, indicated that while there was no significant jump 
at the first breakpoint, there was one at the second, which is evident by the dramatic shift 
on the chart at quarter 113.  The slopes of the three periods, however, were not 
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significantly different from each other.  The implementation period slope increases 
slightly from the pre-ORM period, and the post-implementation period slope decreases 
from the implementation period.  Although the slope decreased from the previous period, 
it was still increasing, but it may indicate some successful effects from ORM.   
Summary. 
 
 To determine whether any rate changes were caused by the implementation of 
ORM, discontinuous piecewise linear regression was performed.  Discontinuous 
piecewise linear regression determines whether a slope or intercept change is present at a 
selected point in time (Neter and others, 1996).  Analyses were performed on a number of 
data sets, including annual rates, quarterly rates, quarterly sortie rates, and human factors 
mishaps.  Class A and B data were analyzed for both the Air Force and the Army.  None 
of the tests indicated a downward shift in mishaps nor a reduction in slope after 
implementation.   
IQ.5:  Have the proportion of human factor related mishaps changed since 
implementation? 
 To determine whether the relative proportion of human factor mishap causes have 
changed since implementation of ORM, the Chi-Square Goodness of Fit Test was used to 
analyze annual causal data.  If ORM were effective, one would expect a reduction in the 
proportion of human factor mishaps.  A summary of the Chi-Square test results can be 
found in Appendix S.  The overall proportions of AF human factor causes since 1991 are 
shown in Figure 22.  Human factors play a role in about 70% of Class A mishaps and 
40% of Class B mishaps. 
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Figure 22.  AF Human Factors Mishap Proportions 
 
 
The trend line for Class A mishaps increased slightly, while the trend line for Class B 
mishaps remained nearly level.   
 The overall proportions of Army human factors causes are shown in Figure 23.  
Approximately 80% of Army aviation mishaps are human factors related. 
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Figure 23.  Army Human Factors Mishap Proportions 
 
 
Data. 
 
 AF and Army Class A and B annual mishap causal data were analyzed in these 
tests.  The data format was a yearly number count of mishap categories provided by 
analysts from both the AF and Army Safety Centers (Air Force Safety Center, 2003b), 
(Army Safety Center, 2002).  Mishaps may have more than one associated cause 
category. 
AF Results. 
The Chi-Squared test identified differences in the sample behavior of pre- and 
post-ORM mishap cause categories.  The causes examined, their hypothesized 
proportion, observed frequencies, and expected frequencies for Class A are shown in 
Table 37.   
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Table 37.   AF Class A.1 Chi-Square Values 
  Hyp Prop Freq Exp Freq Inc/Dec 
Accepted Risk 0.03 38 19.90 Inc 
Attention Mgt 0.00 49 1.00 Inc 
Cognitive Funct 0.00 21 1.00 Inc 
Discipline 0.04 18 27.48 Dec 
Emotional State 0.09 40 54.97 Dec 
Inad Risk Assess 0.01 21 4.74 Inc 
Judgment 0.25 135 160.16 Dec 
Manning 0.00 1 1.00 -- 
Perceptions 0.07 47 44.54 -- 
Physiological 0.03 9 18.01 Dec 
Preparations 0.01 14 9.48 Inc 
Proficiency 0.03 25 17.06 Inc 
Self Induced Stressors 0.00 2 1.00 -- 
Training 0.04 17 23.69 Dec 
Unauth Mod 0.00 1 1.00 -- 
Unknown 0.12 43 75.81 Dec 
 
 Given a 0.05 level of significance and 15 degrees of freedom, the critical χ2 value 
was 32.8.  The test statistic, χ2, using the data from Table 37 equaled 2787.57, well 
beyond the critical value and well inside the rejection region.   
 Based on these results, the null hypothesis that the proportions are the same is 
rejected, indicating that a statistically significant change had occurred since 
implementation.  Interestingly, the Accepted Risk and Inadequate Risk Assessment 
categories both showed significant increases, which is counter-intuitive to expectations.  
Several of the categories had extremely large increases because there were no recorded 
incidences of those categories before 1996.  A shift in the accounting policy is likely, so 
the test was run again with those categories removed.  These values are shown in Table 
38. 
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Table 38.  AF Class A.2 Chi Squared Values  
  Hyp Prop Freq Exp Freq Inc/Dec 
Accepted Risk 0.03 38 12.78 Inc 
Discipline 0.04 18 17.64 Dec 
Emotional State 0.09 40 35.29 Dec 
Inad Risk Assess 0.01 21 3.04 Inc 
Judgment 0.25 135 106.5 Dec 
Perceptions 0.07 47 28.59 -- 
Physiological 0.03 9 11.56 Dec 
Preparations 0.01 14 6.08 Inc 
Proficiency 0.03 25 10.95 Inc 
Training 0.04 17 15.21 Dec 
Unknown 0.12 43 48.67 Dec 
 
 
With 10 degrees of freedom, the critical χ2 value is 18.3.  The resultant χ2 value is 
110.2, far exceeding the critical value and indicating a rejection of the null hypothesis.  
We may therefore conclude that the population proportions are different.  While five of 
the categories decreased, another five exceeded their expected frequencies, contrary to 
expectations.  One category, judgment, maintained its historical proportions.  It cannot, 
therefore, be concluded that the proportions of human factor related Class A mishaps 
have decreased since ORM was implemented.  Accepted Risk and Inadequate Risk 
Assessment once again increased in proportions.   
Results from the Chi-Squared test on AF Class B data are shown in Table 39. 
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Table 39.  AF Class B Chi Squared Values 
  Hyp Prop Freq Exp Freq Inc/Dec 
Accepted Risk 0.07 21 30.28 Dec 
Attention Mgt 0.00 17 1.00 Inc 
Cognitive Funct 0.00 5 1.00 Inc 
Discipline 0.05 9 20.19 Dec 
Emotional State 0.04 14 17.66 Dec 
Inad Risk Assess 0.01 17 2.52 Inc 
Judgment 0.08 58 35.33 Dec 
Manning 0.01 1 1.00 -- 
Perceptions 0.06 17 27.76 Dec 
Physiological 0.01 0 2.52 Dec 
Preparations 0.02 6 10.09 Dec 
Proficiency 0.00 11 0.00 Inc 
Self Induced Stressors 0.00 0 1.00 -- 
Training 0.02 12 7.57 Inc 
Unauth Mod 0.00 0 1.00 -- 
Unknown 0.15 53 65.60 Dec 
  
Given a 0.05 level of significance and 15 degrees of freedom, the critical χ2 value 
was 32.8.  The test statistic, χ2, using the data from Table 39, equaled 379.41, well 
beyond the critical value and well inside the rejection region.   
 Based on these results, the null hypothesis that the proportions are the same is 
rejected, indicating that a statistically significant change had occurred since 
implementation.  Five of the categories increased their proportions, eight decreased, and 
three remained relatively unchanged.  In general, results show that the human factors 
causal proportions slightly decreased since ORM implementation.  ORM specific 
categories were inconclusive, as the Accepted Risk category showed a decrease while 
Inadequate Risk Assessment categories increased.   
Army Results. 
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The same testing methodology was applied to Army human factors causes.  A 
shift in accounting methods and terminology in 1995 yielded any such data beyond that 
point unreliable.  Therefore, the Army tests include only data from 1981 to 1994, seven 
years after implementation.  Class A mishap categories, hypothesized proportions, 
observed frequencies, and expected frequencies are shown in Table 40.  Class B values 
are shown in Table 41. 
Table 40.  Army Class A Chi-Square Values 
  Hyp Prop Freq Exp Freq Inc/Dec 
Anticipate 0.04 16 16.41 -- 
Comply w/ General Rules 0.05 19 20.32 -- 
Follow Procedures/Orders 0.15 73 56.26 Inc 
Recognize 0.05 18 20.32 -- 
Attention 0.08 21 31.26 Dec 
Complex Physical Action 0.09 25 35.16 Dec 
Decision 0.11 30 40.64 Dec 
Communication 0.03 30 10.94 Inc 
Inspection/Search 0.04 42 15.63 Inc 
Planning 0.06 5 22.66 Dec 
Insufficient Info Reported 0.00 3 1.56 -- 
Misinterpreted 0.01 8 4.69 Inc 
Clearance/Speed/Weight 0.04 22 16.41 Inc 
 
 
Table 41.  Army Class B Chi-Square Values 
  Hyp Prop Freq Exp Freq Inc/Dec 
Anticipate 0.05 17 7.89 Inc 
Comply w/ General Rules 0.03 8 3.94 Inc 
Follow Procedures/Orders 0.15 52 22.88 Inc 
Recognize 0.08 25 11.83 Inc 
Attention 0.02 21 2.37 Inc 
Complex Physical Action 0.10 28 14.99 Inc 
Decision 0.09 32 13.41 Inc 
Communication 0.07 33 11.05 Inc 
Inspection/Search 0.05 20 7.10 Inc 
Planning 0.06 23 9.47 Inc 
Insufficient Info Reported 0.01 4 1.58 Inc 
Misinterpreted 0.02 11 3.16 Inc 
Clearance/Speed/Weight 0.08 24 11.83 Inc 
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 Given a level of significance of 0.05 and 12 degrees of freedom, the χ2 critical 
value is 28.29 for both tests.  The Class A data yielded a χ2 of 111.46.  The Class B χ2 
was 372.29.  Both tests yielded χ2 values that exceeded the critical value, so both tests 
reject the null hypothesis.  Therefore, we may conclude that the population proportions 
are not equal.  For Class A data, it is inconclusive whether proportions have gone down.  
For Class B, all proportions increased.  Results of the tests can be found in Appendix S.   
Summary. 
 
 Using the Chi-Squared Goodness of Fit Test, this investigative question sought to 
determine whether the proportions of human factor related mishaps had decreased since 
the implementation of ORM.  Since ORM is designed to assist individuals in their 
decision-making and risk assessment skills, one would expect to see reductions in risk 
specific cause categories and in human factor cause categories in general. 
 The AF data revealed evidence to the contrary.  While both Class A and B 
showed significant changes in human factor proportions, neither showed significant 
decreases.  Class B proportions slightly decreased while Class A remained even.  
Alarmingly, Class A risk specific categories actually increased proportions. 
 The Army likewise showed significant changes in both Class A and Class B data.  
Class A proportions did not conclusively increase or decrease, but Class B causes 
increased unanimously. 
Summary 
 
 The purpose of this chapter was to answer the overall research question by 
answering the five investigative questions posed in Chapter 1.  For each investigative 
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question the problem was restated, relevant data was described, and answers were 
presented according to the methodology described in chapter 3. 
 The analysis of investigative questions 3 and 4 ultimately allowed us to identify 
differences in the mishap rates contemporaneous with RM and ORM implementation.  
None of the data sets analyzed, for the Air Force or the Army, conclusively showed a 
decrease in mishap rates occurring contemporaneously with ORM implementation, and 
several showed significant increases.  Investigative question 5 identified that the changes 
were also contemporaneous with changes in the proportion human factors mishap causes 
of all four data sets analyzed, and with increases in three of the four.  The results of the 
questions provide strong circumstantial evidence that ORM and RM did not cause 
reductions in mishap rates and that it may be associated with any decreases or increases.   
 The results of the experiment do not identify a causal relationship between the 
mishap rate increases and the ORM program.  Instead, they suggest that the changes seem 
to occur at a point in time concurrent with the implementation of ORM, which could, in 
fact, be attributable to a number of other factors, such as sample demographics, aircraft 
mix, operational changes due to contingency involvement, social turbulence, and others.  
Further discussion of these possible confounds can be found in Chapter 5. 
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Chapter V 
 
 
Chapter Overview 
 
Despite having drastically reduced its mishap rates since the birth of the AF in 
1947, the need to eliminate mishaps altogether persists.  In an effort to continue reducing 
mishap rates, the Air Force implemented the ORM program in 1996, emphasizing an 
atmosphere of safety at all levels.   
A study of the Army’s RM program, the model for the Air Force’s ORM, was 
conducted in 1999, revealing that the program failed to significantly improve Army 
aviation mishap rates (Ashley, 1999).  In fact, the findings of the research suggested that 
accident rates actually increased after RM implementation.  The study concluded that the 
Air Force should therefore not expect mishap rates to decline due to implementation of 
their ORM program. 
This research effort follows Ashley’s recommendation that the AF ORM program 
and its effects on aviation mishap rates be studied.  Its research objective was to 
determine to what degree the implementation of ORM has affected flying safety in the 
Air Force. 
This chapter reviews the findings of the research based on the answers of the 
investigative questions.  It then presents the final conclusions of the thesis by answering 
the overall research question.  Recommendations for the AF’s and Army’s future use of 
ORM are made based on the findings.  Finally, proposals for future research of topics 
stemming from the thesis are presented. 
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The AF acknowledges that recent mishap trends have not been positive.  After 
calling for increased participation in the ORM program in June 2002 (Jumper, 2002a), 
AF Chief of Staff, General John J. Jumper readdressed the issue describing a disturbing 
trend in aviation mishaps in a 20 December 2002 memorandum.  He pointed out that with 
33 Class A mishaps and 22 fatalities, it amounted to one Class A every ten days and the 
equivalent of one entire lost squadron of aircraft valued at $820 million.  Jumper stated 
that 2002 was the third worst in the last ten years in terms of flying safety, and cited 
human factors as the cause in two-thirds of the accidents.  Inexperience, “edge of the 
envelope” flying, insufficient or inadequate guidance, and procedure deviations were the 
leading human factor causes (Jumper, 2002b). 
 General Jumper stated his concern over the increasingly negative trend and 
pointed out that safety and mission are inseparable.  He identified the use of risk 
management principles to identify hazards and reduce risks as the best means of 
reversing the trends (Jumper, 2002b). 
Findings 
 
ORM was developed and implemented as the AF’s primary means of developing 
a safer AF.  It was intended to make flying safer, thereby reducing mishaps.  The overall 
objective of this research was to determine whether or not the program was successful in 
those endeavors.  To that end, a successful Operational Risk Management program 
should see a number of beneficial changes.  First, it should have seen an overall decrease 
of mishaps after it was implemented.  Second, it should have enjoyed an immediate 
downward shift in mishaps and a decreasing trend in mishap rates.  Third, it should have 
forced a decrease in the relative proportion of mishaps due to human error. 
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Based on the results of the analysis of the investigative questions, there is enough 
evidence to say that ORM has not had its desired effect of reducing mishap rates for the 
AF.  Comparison of means testing failed to conclusively show a reduction in mishap rates 
after implementation of the program.  Discontinuous piecewise linear regression failed to 
show a decreasing shift nor decreasing slopes in any of the mishap data sets analyzed.  
Chi squared analysis of the human factor mishap proportions showed that a process 
change had occurred and proportions had changed, but were generally on the rise.  
Furthermore, risk-specific categories were growing in proportion.   
Summary of Confounds 
 
Implementation. 
 An assumption of this thesis is that ORM has been fully implemented and is being 
actively used by Air Force pilots.  It is possible, however, that it is not being used or that 
it is being used incorrectly, and under such circumstances, the mishap increases could not 
be linked causally with ORM.  We would nevertheless come to the same conclusions, 
that ORM was not having its desired affects, although for different reasons.   
Social Considerations. 
 The military was undergoing considerable social turbulence during the mid- to 
late-nineties, which could have had negative affects on attitudes, moods, and other 
psychological aspects.  Military controversies, such as the court martial of Lt. Kelly 
Flynn and suicide of Admiral Jeremy Borda, as well as the scandal in the white house 
were contributors. Since ORM is essentially a social program, it may have been affected 
by such turbulence, thereby skewing the measurable affects of ORM.   
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Manpower Demographics. 
 One noted history threat to the thesis was maintenance and pilot manning.  
Notable decreases in fill rates for key maintainer positions and pilot retention problems 
coincide with mishap rate increases in the late 90’s and early 2000.  A more 
comprehensive study into manning of these key positions and mishaps needs to be 
conducted to determine if there is a substantial relationship, and if so, it could play a 
significant role in the findings, diminishing the lack of affects attributed to ORM. 
Aircraft Mix. 
 A perfunctory examination of the aircraft fleet was performed without indicating 
any obvious confounds, but a more detailed and in-depth analysis must clearly be 
conducted.  For example, each aircraft type should be studied separately to detect 
changes and ageing aircraft should be removed or analyzed separately.  This thesis 
analyzed aggregate data, composed of the entire Air Force fleet.  Various affects from the 
aircraft mix diminish the strength of the findings. 
Kosovo. 
 A simple study of mishap rates in several major contingencies revealed that rates 
tended to go down.  However, Air Force Class B mishaps showed a notable increase 
during involvement in Kosovo.  It is possible that austere runway conditions in the region 
contributed to the increases.  Severe Class A mishaps would most likely not be affected, 
but less severe Class B’s, which could include the wear and tear of hard landings and 
associated damage, might have been increased. 
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Diminishing Returns. 
 Chi-squared testing revealed that the Army enjoyed successful reductions in their 
proportions of risk-related causes after implementation, while the other data sets did not.  
This particular data set had a high rate of pre-ORM incidents of risk-related mishaps, 
while the others did not.  It might indicate that ORM is effective in reducing risk-related 
mishaps if they are a serious problem, but not effective if the risk-related mishaps are less 
historically significant.   
 Breakpoints. 
 Significant slope changes were found at the Air Force ORM breakpoint in 1996 
and in the Army RM breakpoint in 1987 for Class B-C mishaps.  It is possible that some 
significant event, other than ORM/RM implementation happened at those breakpoints to 
cause the slope changes.  If the Air Force rates showed a similar change in slope at the 
Army breakpoint, and if the Army rates showed changes at the Air Force breakpoint, it 
would decrease the likelihood of ORM/RM being responsible for the slope changes.  
Figures 24 and 25 illustrate the switched breakpoints. 
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Figure 24.  Army Class A and B-C 1996 Breakpoint 
 
 
 The Army implemented its program in 1987 and did not experience any slope 
reductions at that breakpoint.  Using 1996 as a breakpoint, there appears to be a slope 
increase in Class B-C mishap rates.  This may indicate a history threat of some sort in 
1996, where the Air Force also detected significant slope increases.  If so, it would 
decrease the likelihood that ORM caused the increases.   
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Figure 22.  AF Class A and B 1987 Breakpoint 
 
 
 The Army experienced a significant slope increase in Class B mishap rates in 
1987, when it implemented its RM program.  The Air Force also shows an obvious slope 
change, which could also indicate that some historical significant event occurred, causing 
the increases.  Since ORM was not implemented until 1996, this would rule it out as a 
cause.  Conversely, the Class B rate appears to hold steady until 1993, and in fact, had a 
noticeable decrease at 1987. 
Recommendations 
 The findings suggest that ORM was not effectively reducing mishap rates, but 
were complicated with a number of unexplained and uncontrolled confounds.  Therefore 
the recommendation of this thesis is to conduct more research into the problem.  Ideas for 
further research are described in the next section of this chapter. 
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Future Research 
 Several proposals for future research, based on findings and confounds that arose 
during the research, are now presented. 
 Proposal 1. 
 History is often a source of confound within time-series experiments.  One such 
confound may exist in the aircraft mix within the fleet during the analysis.  The tests in 
this thesis were conducted on aggregate data--that is, the entire mix of aircraft within the 
fleet.  Useful insight could be garnered with studies on individual aircraft types.  For 
example, it might be interesting to uncover the mishap rate trends over the lifespan of the 
F-16 or whether the associated mishap causes were increasingly due to human error or 
not.  The removal from the data pool of the older, retired planes could also affect 
analytical outcomes.  Further analysis of maintainability factors, ageing, and associated 
safety factors could shed some valuable light on the Air Force’s mishap trends. 
Proposal 2. 
The Navy and Marine Corps began officially implementing similar RM programs 
in April 1997.  A similar study of their mishap data could prove useful to further identify 
ORM’s efficacy.  If the Navy/Marine Corps program were to show mishap reductions, 
understanding what they are doing differently could shed light on the Army and AF’s 
apparent lack of results. 
Proposal 3. 
This research was conducted on limited data.  The AFSC could only provide one 
type of aviation data for analysis:  unsuccessful sorties.  To better analyze and understand 
ORM’s effects on sorties, successful sortie data should be included.  Failures (mishaps) 
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and successes (non-crashes) should be analyzed side by side to identify the key factors 
that cause mishaps.  If extensive data were available for each sortie, a multivariate factor 
analysis could be conducted.  Unfortunately, such data is not currently available.  A study 
leading to the development of a comprehensive database that could store all such data 
would be enormously valuable to the safety community. 
Proposal 4. 
The AF implemented ORM to establish an atmosphere of safety at all levels at all 
times, including non-aviation and off-duty activities.  Techniques similar to the ones used 
in this research could be performed on non-aviation mishaps to learn more about the 
effects of ORM. 
Summary 
 This chapter presented findings, conclusions, recommendations, and future 
research proposals.  The research studied the AF’s ORM program and its effects on 
aviation safety to determine whether ORM had successfully reduced aviation mishap 
rates.  Analysis identified several significant increases in the slopes of mishap rates 
contemporaneous with the implementation of ORM.  It concluded that the AF has not 
seen a significant reduction in its aviation mishap rates since ORM was implemented and 
recommends further research. 
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Appendix A.  USAF Historical Mishap Data 
 
USAF HISTORY 
1947-2002 
      
   CLASS A CLASS B  
YEAR #  RATE # RATE HOURS 
      
65 304 4.57 85 1.28 6648121 
66 345 4.91 95 1.35 7030015 
67 332 4.54 104 1.42 7311121 
68 311 3.90 101 1.27 7983688 
69 299 4.05 66 0.89 7388976 
70 201 3.05 58 0.88 6597248 
71 141 2.45 48 0.83 5754376 
72 163 3.04 52 0.97 5356984 
73 102 2.37 42 0.98 4307058 
74 108 2.89 33 0.88 3736870 
75 93 2.77 23 0.68 3359170 
76 87 2.81 21 0.68 3094317 
77 90 2.84 299 9.45 3164334 
78 98 3.16 404 13.02 3102541 
79 94 2.95 67 2.10 3189969 
80 81 2.56 56 1.80 3118938 
81 80 2.44 54 1.67 3237027 
82 78 2.33 16 0.48 3352123 
83 59 1.73 17 0.50 3407085 
84 62 1.77 22 0.64 3446291 
85 53 1.49 25 0.72 3491318 
86 62 1.79 16 0.46 3454716 
87 40 1.51 16 0.60 2650469 
88 55 1.64 24 0.72 3345384 
89 56 1.59 4 0.12 3406291 
90 51 1.49 13 0.39 3366126 
91 41 1.11 16 0.43 3684741 
92 48 1.69 11 0.39 2787867 
93 34 1.35 15 0.59 2525935 
94 35 1.46 16 0.71 2256251 
95 32 1.44 19 0.86 2215310 
96 27 1.24 11 0.51 2169696 
97 29 1.37 15 0.71 2119682 
98 24 1.14 9 0.43 2111154 
99 33 1.55 26 1.22 2130958 
00 22 1.08 83 4.08 2036757 
01 24 1.16 76 3.68 2067104 
02 35 1.52 76 3.30 2303480 
        
TOTAL 3829 2.28 2134 1.62 142709491 
118 
  
Appendix B.  US Army Historical Mishap Data 
 
US ARMY HISTORY 
1973-2002 
      
 Class A  Class B-C  Flying 
FY Number Rate Number Rate Hours 
73 64 4.09 282 18.02 1564594 
74 51 3.24 265 16.85 1572314 
75 52 3.52 246 16.65 1477625 
76 48 3.24 288 19.41 1483553 
77 45 3 282 18.81 1498906 
78 45 3.1 243 16.76 1449788 
79 39 2.7 232 16.07 1443836 
80 36 2.34 296 19.25 1537508 
81 43 2.63 312 19.11 1632790 
82 52 3.29 176 11.14 1580162 
83 37 2.33 128 8.05 1589599 
84 39 2.53 87 5.65 1538610 
85 45 2.94 86 5.61 1531829 
86 32 1.97 96 5.90 1628163 
87 37 2.17 84 4.93 1704675 
88 32 1.84 48 2.76 1741997 
89 32 1.9 89 5.28 1685100 
90 31 1.83 79 4.67 1690601 
91 48 3.69 108 8.31 1299734 
92 22 1.57 88 6.29 1400052 
93 23 1.77 103 7.93 1299337 
94 21 1.64 95 7.43 1278098 
95 10 0.83 85 7.06 1203719 
96 8 0.74 81 7.49 1082006 
97 12 1.26 70 7.35 952999 
98 12 1.34 74 8.24 897870 
99 18 1.97 106 11.60 913705 
00 6 0.619 73 7.54 967741.9 
01 10 1.022 87 8.87 980392.2 
02 26 2.56 89 8.76 1015625 
      
TOTALS 976 2.2557 4378 10.39 41642929 
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Appendix C.  AF Class A Residual Frequency Distribution and Normality Test 
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Residuals Statistics 
Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation N
Predicted Value 1.2266 1.6854 1.4560 .1429 20
Residual -.3822 .2934 -1.0658E-15 .1680 20
a  Dependent Variable: RATE_A 
 
One-Sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test 
 Unstandardized Residual 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Z .464 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .983 
a  Test distribution is Normal. 
b  Calculated from data. 
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Appendix D.  AF Class B Residual Frequency Distribution and Normality Test 
 
 
Normal P-P Plot of Residuals
Dependent Variable: RATE_B
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Residuals Statistics 
Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation N
Predicted Value -.1564 2.2624 1.0530 .7532 20
Residual -1.3232 2.0722 -9.1926E-15 .8863 20
a  Dependent Variable: RATE_B 
 
One-Sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test 
 Unstandardized Residual 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Z .900 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .392 
a  Test distribution is Normal. 
b  Calculated from data. 
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Appendix E.  Army Class A Residual Frequency Distribution and Normality Test 
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Residuals Statistics 
Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation N
Predicted Value 1.0743 3.4370 2.2557 .7172 30
Residual -.8232 1.7195 -3.4491E-15 .5712 30
a  Dependent Variable: RATE_A 
 
One-Sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test 
Unstandardized Residual
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Z 1.192
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .117
a  Test distribution is Normal. 
b  Calculated from data. 
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Appendix F.  Army Class B-C Residual Frequency Distribution and Normality Test 
 
 
Normal P-P Plot of Residuals
Dependent Variable: RATE_BC
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Residuals Statistics 
Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation N
Predicted Value 4.5415 16.2445 10.3930 3.5526 30
Residual -7.4312 6.0939 4.086E-14 3.9610 30
a  Dependent Variable: RATE_BC 
 
One-Sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test 
Unstandardized Residual
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Z .656
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .782
a  Test distribution is Normal. 
b  Calculated from data. 
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Appendix G.  AF PPI Values 
 
Class A  Class B 
FY Rate PPI (x-mean)2  FY Rate PPI (x-mean)^2
1983 1.73 10.00 0.088  1983 0.50 10.00 8.820 
1984 1.77 10.22 0.006  1984 0.64 12.79 0.031 
1985 1.49 8.41 3.540  1985 0.72 11.22 3.072 
1986 1.79 12.05 3.074  1986 0.46 6.47 42.276 
1987 1.51 8.41 3.561  1987 0.60 13.03 0.004 
1988 1.64 10.89 0.357  1988 0.72 11.88 1.179 
1989 1.59 11.00 0.495  1989 0.12 11.00 3.880 
1990 1.49 9.37 0.858  1990 0.39 32.89 396.727 
1991 1.11 7.49 7.869  1991 0.43 11.24 2.980 
1992 1.69 15.15 23.572  1992 0.39 9.09 15.078 
1993 1.35 7.98 5.345  1993 0.59 15.05 4.329 
1994 1.46 10.87 0.325  1994 0.71 11.94 1.057 
1995 1.44 12.00 2.903 Pre-ORM 1995 0.86 12.00 0.941 
1996 1.24 8.61 4.175 Post-ORM 1996 0.51 5.91 95.790 
1997 1.37 10.99 0.113  1997 0.71 13.96 3.029 
1998 1.14 8.31 5.517  1998 0.43 6.02 93.590 
1999 1.55 13.62 8.786  1999 1.22 28.62 166.978 
2000 1.08 6.98 13.566  2000 4.08 33.40 313.329 
2001 1.16 13.00 5.484  2001 3.68 13.00 7.282 
2002 1.52 13.09 5.922  2002 3.30 8.98 45.197 
         
83-95 96-02  83-95 96-02 
mean =  10.30 mean =  10.66  mean =  12.97 mean =  15.70 
variance = 4.33 variance = 17.19  variance = 40.03 variance = 120.87 
         
 Sp^2 = 5.06 ---pooled variance--- Sp^2 = 65.23  
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Appendix H.  Army PPI Values 
 
Class A  Class B-C 
FY Rate PPI (x-mean)2  FY Rate PPI (x-mean)2
1973 4.09 10.00 0.008  1987 18.02 10.00 0.250 
1974 3.24 7.92 3.954  1987 16.85 9.35 0.022 
1975 3.52 10.86 0.910  1987 16.65 9.88 0.143 
1976 3.24 9.20 0.498  1987 19.41 11.66 4.669 
1977 3 9.26 0.424  1987 18.81 9.69 0.037 
1978 3.1 10.33 0.179  1987 16.76 8.91 0.349 
1979 2.7 11.00 1.187  1987 16.07 9.59 0.008 
1980 2.34 8.67 1.547  1987 19.25 11.98 6.159 
1981 2.63 11.24 1.766  1987 19.11 9.93 0.181 
1982 3.29 12.51 6.756  1987 11.14 5.83 13.474 
1983 2.33 7.08 7.999  1987 8.05 7.23 5.153 
1984 2.53 10.86 0.899  1987 5.65 7.02 6.138 
1985 2.94 12.00 4.367  1987 5.61 9.93 0.184 
1986 1.97 6.70 10.302  1987 5.90 10.50 1.005 
1987 2.17 11.02 1.221 Pre-RM 1987 4.93 11.00 2.251 
1988 1.84 8.48 6.103 Post-RM 1988 2.76 5.59 28.908 
1989 1.90 10.33 0.389  1989 5.28 19.17 67.228 
1990 1.83 9.63 1.737  1990 4.67 8.85 4.498 
1991 3.69 13.00 4.204  1991 8.31 17.78 46.426 
1992 1.57 4.25 44.823  1992 6.29 7.56 11.588 
1993 1.77 11.27 0.105  1993 7.93 12.61 2.701 
1994 1.64 9.27 2.836  1994 7.43 9.38 2.534 
1995 0.83 5.06 34.677  1995 7.06 9.50 2.156 
1996 0.74 8.92 4.137  1996 7.49 10.60 0.135 
1997 1.26 14.00 9.304  1997 7.35 9.81 1.338 
1998 1.34 10.63 0.099  1998 8.24 11.22 0.064 
1999 1.97 14.70 14.076  1999 11.60 14.07 9.649 
2000 0.62 3.14 60.958  2000 7.54 6.50 19.967 
2001 1.02 16.51 30.922  2001 8.87 12.00 1.064 
2002 2.56 25.05 198.788  2002 8.76 9.88 1.193 
         
83-95 96-02  83-95 96-02 
mean =  9.91 mean =  10.95  mean =  9.50 mean =  10.97 
variance = 3.00 variance = 29.51  variance = 2.86 variance = 14.25 
         
 Sp^2 = 15.98 ---pooled variance--- Sp^2 = 8.82 
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Appendix I.  AF Exponential Smoothing Transformation 
  
AF Class A AF Class B 
Year Observation 
Smoothed 
Value 
Smoothed 
Trend Year Observation
Smoothed 
Value 
Smoothed 
Trend 
72 3.04 3.04 0.00 72 0.97 3.04 0.00 
73 2.37 2.84 -0.06 73 0.98 2.42 -0.19 
74 2.89 2.81 -0.05 74 0.88 1.83 -0.31 
75 2.77 2.76 -0.05 75 0.68 1.27 -0.38 
76 2.81 2.74 -0.04 76 0.68 0.83 -0.40 
77 2.84 2.74 -0.03 77 9.45 3.13 0.41 
78 3.16 2.85 0.01 78 13.02 6.39 1.26 
79 2.95 2.89 0.02 79 2.10 5.98 0.76 
80 2.56 2.80 -0.01 80 1.80 5.26 0.32 
81 2.44 2.69 -0.04 81 1.67 4.41 -0.03 
82 2.33 2.55 -0.07 82 0.48 3.20 -0.38 
83 1.73 2.25 -0.14 83 0.50 2.12 -0.59 
84 1.77 2.01 -0.17 84 0.64 1.26 -0.67 
85 1.49 1.74 -0.20 85 0.72 0.63 -0.66 
86 1.79 1.61 -0.18 86 0.46 0.11 -0.62 
87 1.51 1.46 -0.17 87 0.60 -0.17 -0.52 
88 1.64 1.39 -0.14 88 0.72 -0.27 -0.39 
89 1.59 1.35 -0.11 89 0.12 -0.43 -0.32 
90 1.49 1.32 -0.09 90 0.39 -0.41 -0.22 
91 1.11 1.19 -0.10 91 0.43 -0.31 -0.12 
92 1.69 1.27 -0.04 92 0.39 -0.18 -0.05 
93 1.35 1.26 -0.03 93 0.59 0.01 0.02 
94 1.46 1.30 -0.01 94 0.71 0.24 0.09 
95 1.44 1.33 0.00 95 0.86 0.49 0.13 
96 1.24 1.31 -0.01 96 0.51 0.58 0.12 
97 1.37 1.32 0.00 97 0.71 0.71 0.12 
98 1.14 1.26 -0.02 98 0.43 0.71 0.09 
99 1.55 1.34 0.01 99 1.22 0.92 0.12 
100 1.08 1.27 -0.01 100 4.08 1.96 0.40 
101 1.16 1.23 -0.02 101 3.68 2.75 0.52 
102 1.52 1.30 0.01 102 3.30 3.28 0.52 
        
alpha 0.3   alpha 0.3   
beta 0.3   beta 0.3   
        
MAD alpha/beta   MAD alpha/beta   
3.64 0.5   26.41 0.5   
5.55 0.3   40.63 0.3   
9.44 0.1   55.97 0.1   
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Appendix J.  Army Exponential Smoothing Transformation 
 
Army Class A Army Class B-C 
Year Observation 
Smoothed 
Value 
Smoothed 
Trend Year Observation
Smoothed 
Value 
Smoothed 
Trend 
73 4.09 4.09 0.00 73 18.02 18.02 0.00
74 3.24 3.84 -0.08 74 16.85 17.67 -0.10
75 3.52 3.69 -0.10 75 16.65 17.29 -0.19
76 3.24 3.48 -0.13 76 19.41 17.80 0.02
77 3.00 3.25 -0.16 77 18.81 18.12 0.11
78 3.10 3.09 -0.16 78 16.76 17.79 -0.02
79 2.70 2.86 -0.18 79 16.07 17.26 -0.17
80 2.34 2.58 -0.21 80 19.25 17.73 0.02
81 2.63 2.45 -0.19 81 19.11 18.16 0.14
82 3.29 2.57 -0.10 82 11.14 16.15 -0.50
83 2.33 2.43 -0.11 83 8.05 13.37 -1.19
84 2.53 2.38 -0.09 84 5.65 10.23 -1.77
85 2.94 2.49 -0.03 85 5.61 7.60 -2.03
86 1.97 2.31 -0.07 86 5.90 5.67 -2.00
87 2.17 2.22 -0.08 87 4.93 4.05 -1.89
88 1.84 2.05 -0.11 88 2.76 2.34 -1.83
89 1.90 1.93 -0.11 89 5.28 1.94 -1.40
90 1.83 1.82 -0.11 90 4.67 1.78 -1.03
91 3.69 2.30 0.07 91 8.31 3.01 -0.35
92 1.57 2.13 0.00 92 6.29 3.75 -0.02
93 1.77 2.02 -0.04 93 7.93 4.99 0.35
94 1.64 1.88 -0.07 94 7.43 5.97 0.54
95 0.83 1.52 -0.16 95 7.06 6.68 0.59
96 0.74 1.18 -0.21 96 7.49 7.33 0.61
97 1.26 1.05 -0.19 97 7.35 7.76 0.56
98 1.34 1.01 -0.14 98 8.24 8.30 0.55
99 1.97 1.20 -0.04 99 11.60 9.67 0.80
100 0.619 0.99 -0.09 100 7.54 9.59 0.53
101 1.022 0.94 -0.08 101 8.87 9.75 0.42
102 2.56 1.37 0.07 102 8.76 9.75 0.29
        
alpha 0.3   alpha 0.3   
beta 0.3   beta 0.3   
        
MAD alpha/beta   MAD alpha/beta   
7.65 0.5   32.77 0.5   
9.79 0.3   55.33 0.3   
15.47 0.1   104.15 0.1   
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Appendix K.  AF Comparison of Means Tests, Rates 
 
1. Simple comparison of means 
 
pre_post  A_AF B_AF
pre_orm Mean 1.5431 .5485
N 13 13
Std. 
Deviation 
.1892 .1942
post_orm Mean 1.2943 1.9900
N 7 7
Std. 
Deviation 
.1883 1.6225
Total Mean 1.4560 1.0530
N 20 20
Std. 
Deviation 
.2205 1.1631
Class A decrease. 
Class B increase. 
 
2.  ANOVA   
 
 Sum of 
Squares
df Mean 
Square
F Sig.
RATE_A Between 
Groups 
.282 1 .282 7.891 .012
Within 
Groups 
.642 18 3.569E-02
Total .924 19
RATE_B Between 
Groups 
9.455 1 9.455 10.474 .005
Within 
Groups 
16.248 18 .903
Total 25.703 19
Class A significance less than 0.05, so reject null hypothesis—means are not equal. 
Class B significance less than 0.05, so reject null hypothesis—means are not equal. 
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Appendix K.  AF Comparison of Means Tests, Rates, continued 
 
3. T-Test 
 
Levene's Test
for Equality of 
Variances
t-test for Equality of Means 
 
 
 
F Sig. t df Sig. (2-
tailed)
Mean 
Differen
ce
Std. 
Error 
Differen
ce
95% Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference
Lower Upper
RATE_
A
Equal 
variances 
assumed
.072 .792 2.809 18 .012 .24888.857E-
02
6.272E-02 .4349
Equal 
variances 
not 
assumed
2.813 12.457 .015 .24888.843E-
02
5.689E-02 .4407
RATE_
B
Equal 
variances 
assumed
121.947 .000 -3.236 18 .005 -1.4415 .4454 -2.3773 -.5058
Equal 
variances 
not 
assumed
-2.342 6.093 .057 -1.4415 .6156 -2.9424 5.929E-02
Class A significance less than 0.025, so reject null hypothesis—means are not equal. 
Class B significance less than 0.025 when equal variances assumed—so reject null hypothesis—means are 
not equal.  Do not reject when equal variances are not assumed. 
 
4.  Mann Whitney U and Wilcoxon W tests 
 
RATE_A RATE_B
Mann-Whitney U 19.000 20.000
Wilcoxon W 47.000 111.000
Z -2.101 -2.024
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .036 .043
Exact Sig. [2*(1-tailed Sig.)] .037 .046
Class A significance greater than 0.025, so do not reject null hypothesis—means are equal. 
Class B significance greater than 0.025, so do not reject null hypothesis—means are equal. 
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Appendix L.  Army Comparison of Means Tests, Rates 
 
1.  Simple comparison of means 
 
rm  RATE_A RATE_BC
pre rm Mean 2.8727 13.4807
N 15 15
Std. 
Deviation 
.5676 5.8359
post rm Mean 1.6387 7.3053
N 15 15
Std. 
Deviation 
.7768 2.0387
Total Mean 2.2557 10.3930
N 30 30
Std. 
Deviation 
.9169 5.3208
Class A decrease. 
Class B/C decrease. 
 
2. ANOVA 
 
 Sum of 
Squares
df Mean 
Square
F Sig.
RATE_A Between 
Groups 
11.421 1 11.421 24.676 .000
Within 
Groups 
12.959 28 .463
Total 24.380 29
RATE_BC Between 
Groups 
286.011 1 286.011 14.969 .001
Within 
Groups 
534.999 28 19.107
Total 821.010 29
Class A significance less than 0.05, so reject null hypothesis—means are not equal. 
Class B/C significance less than 0.05, so reject null hypothesis—means are not equal. 
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Appendix L.  Army Comparison of Means Tests, Rates, continued 
 
3.  T-Test 
 
 Levene's
Test for
Equality of
Variances
t-test for Equality of Means 
 F Sig. t df Sig. (2-
tailed)
Mean 
Differen
ce
Std. 
Error 
Differen
ce
95% 
Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference
 Lower Upper
RATE_
A
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
.297 .590 4.968 28 .000 1.2340 .2484 .7251 1.7429
Equal 
variances not 
assumed 
4.968 25.633 .000 1.2340 .2484 .7230 1.7450
RATE_
BC
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
36.213 .000 3.869 28 .001 6.1753 1.5961 2.9058 9.4448
Equal 
variances not 
assumed 
3.869 17.367 .001 6.1753 1.5961 2.8132 9.5375
Class A significance less than 0.025, so reject null hypothesis—means are not equal. 
Class B/C significance less than 0.025, so reject null hypothesis—means are not equal. 
 
4.  Mann Whitney U and Wilcoxon W tests 
 
RATE_A RATE_BC
Mann-Whitney U 19.500 55.000
Wilcoxon W 139.500 175.000
Z -3.858 -2.385
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .017
Exact Sig. [2*(1-tailed 
Sig.)]
.000 .016
Class A significance less than 0.025, so reject null hypothesis—means are not equal. 
Class B/C significance less than 0.025, so reject null hypothesis—means are not equal. 
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Appendix M.  AF Comparison of Means Tests, PPI 
 
1. Simple comparison of means 
 
ORM PPI_A PPI_B
Pre ORM Mean 10.2954 12.9692
N 13 13
Std. 
Deviation
2.0821 6.3273
Post ORM Mean 10.6571 15.6986
N 7 7
Std. 
Deviation
2.6932 10.9942
Total Mean 10.4220 13.9245
N 20 20
Std. 
Deviation
2.2494 8.0771
Class A slight increase. 
Class B increase. 
 
2.  ANOVA   
 
Sum of 
Squares 
df Mean 
Square
F Sig.
PPI_A Between 
Groups
.595 1 .595 .112 .742
Within 
Groups
95.540 18 5.308
Total 96.136 19
PPI_B Between 
Groups
33.894 1 33.894 .506 .486
Within 
Groups
1205.659 18 66.981
Total 1239.553 19
Class A significance greater than 0.05, so do not reject null hypothesis—means are equal. 
Class B significance greater than 0.05, so do not reject null hypothesis—means are equal. 
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Appendix M.  AF Comparison of Means Tests, PPI, continued 
 
3.  T-Test  
 
Levene's Test
for Equality of
Variances
t-test for Equality of Means
 
F Sig. t df Sig. 
(2-
tailed
)
Mean 
Differen
ce
Std. Error 
Differenc
e
95% Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference
Lower Upper
PPI_
A
Equal 
variances 
assumed
1.695 .209 -.335 18 .742 -.3618 1.0801 -2.6309 1.9074
Equal 
variances not 
assumed
-.309 9.967 .764 -.3618 1.1703 -2.9705 2.2470
PPI_
B
Equal 
variances 
assumed
4.517 .048 -.711 18 .486 -2.7293 3.8368 -10.7902 5.3315
Equal 
variances not 
assumed
-.605 8.201 .561 -2.7293 4.5108 -13.0871 7.6284
Class A significance greater than 0.025, so do not reject null hypothesis—means are equal. 
Class B significance greater than 0.025, so do not reject null hypothesis—means are equal. 
 
4.  Mann Whitney U and Wilcoxon W tests 
 
PPI_A PPI_B
Mann-Whitney U 40.000 44.000
Wilcoxon W 131.000 135.000
Z -.436 -.119
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .663 .905
Exact Sig. [2*(1-tailed Sig.)] .699 .938
Class A significance greater than 0.025, so do not reject null hypothesis—means are equal. 
Class B significance greater than 0.025, so do not reject null hypothesis—means are equal. 
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Appendix N.  Army Comparison of Means Tests, PPI 
 
1.  Simple means comparison. 
 
rm PPI_A PPI_BC
pre rm Mean 9.9100 9.5000
N 15 15
Std. 
Deviation
1.7330 1.6907
post rm Mean 10.9493 10.9680
N 15 15
Std. 
Deviation
5.4330 3.7744
Total Mean 10.4297 10.2340
N 30 30
Std. 
Deviation
3.9974 2.9690
Slight increases in both PPIs. 
 
2. ANOVA. 
 
Sum of 
Squares 
df Mean 
Square
F Sig.
PPI_A Between 
Groups
8.102 1 8.102 .498 .486
Within 
Groups
455.289 28 16.260
Total 463.391 29
PPI_BC Between 
Groups
16.163 1 16.163 1.890 .180
Within 
Groups
239.464 28 8.552
Total 255.626 29
Class A significance greater than 0.05, so do not reject null hypothesis—means are equal. 
Class B/C significance greater than 0.05, so do not reject null hypothesis—means are equal. 
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Appendix N.  Army Comparison of Means Tests, PPI, continued 
 
3. Independent T-test. 
 
Levene's Test 
for Equality of 
Variances 
 
t-test for Equality of Means 
F Sig. t df Sig. (2-
tailed)
Mean 
Differen
ce
Std. Error 
Difference
95% Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference
 Lower Upper
PPI_
A
Equal 
variances 
assumed
6.081 .020 -.706 28 .486 -1.0393 1.4724 -4.0555 1.9768
Equal 
variances 
not 
assumed
 -.706 16.820 .490 -1.0393 1.4724 -4.1484 2.0698
PPI_
BC
Equal 
variances 
assumed
5.323 .029 -1.375 28 .180 -1.4680 1.0678 -3.6554 .7194
Equal 
variances 
not 
assumed
 -1.375 19.401 .185 -1.4680 1.0678 -3.6999 .7639
Class A significance greater than 0.025, so do not reject null hypothesis—means are equal. 
Class B/C significance greater than 0.025, so do not reject null hypothesis—means are equal. 
 
4.  Mann Whitney 
 
PPI_A PPI_BC
Mann-Whitney U 102.500 93.500
Wilcoxon W 222.500 213.500
Z -.415 -.788
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .678 .431
Exact Sig. [2*(1-tailed Sig.)] .683 .436
Class A significance greater than 0.025, so do not reject null hypothesis—means are equal. 
Class B/C significance greater than 0.025, so do not reject null hypothesis—means are equal. 
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Appendix O.  AF Comparison of Means, Exponential Smoothing 
 
1.  Simple means comparison. 
 
orm  AF_A AF_B
pre orm Mean 2.0192 1.5996
N 24 24
Std. 
Deviation 
.6897 2.1013
post orm Mean 1.2867 1.7217
N 6 6
Std. 
Deviation 
4.082E-02 1.1164
Total Mean 1.8727 1.6240
N 30 30
Std. 
Deviation 
.6829 1.9285
Class A decreased. 
Class B increased. 
 
2. ANOVA. 
 
 Sum of 
Squares
df Mean 
Square
F Sig.
AF_A Between 
Groups 
2.575 1 2.575 6.586 .016
Within 
Groups 
10.950 28 .391
Total 13.525 29
AF_B Between 
Groups 
7.154E-02 1 7.154E-02 .019 .893
Within 
Groups 
107.785 28 3.849
Total 107.857 29
Class A significance less than 0.05, so reject—means are not equal. 
Class B significance greater than 0.05, so do not reject—means are equal. 
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Appendix O.  AF Comparison of Means, Exponential Smoothing, continued 
 
3. Independent T-Test 
 
Levene's Test 
for Equality of 
Variances 
 
t-test for Equality of Means 
 
F Sig. t df Sig. (2-
tailed)
Mean 
Difference
Std. Error 
Difference
95% Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference
Lower Upper
AF_A Equal 
variances 
assumed
48.044 .000 2.566 28 .016 .7325 .2854 .1478 1.3172
Equal 
variances not 
assumed
5.167 23.62
8
.000 .7325 .1418 .4397 1.0253
AF_B Equal 
variances 
assumed
2.280 .142 -.136 28 .893 -.1221 .8955 -1.9565 1.7123
Equal 
variances not 
assumed
-.195 15.18
8
.848 -.1221 .6259 -1.4547 1.2105
Class A significance less than 0.025, so reject null hypothesis—means are not equal. 
Class B significance greater than 0.025, so do not reject null hypothesis—means are equal. 
 
4.  Mann-Whitney 
 
AF_A AF_B
Mann-Whitney U 21.000 53.000
Wilcoxon W 42.000 353.000
Z -2.646 -.985
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .008 .325
Exact Sig. [2*(1-tailed Sig.)] .006 .347
Class A significance less than 0.025, so reject null hypothesis—means are not equal. 
Class B significance greater than 0.025, so do not reject null hypothesis—means are equal. 
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Appendix P.  Army Comparison of Means, Exponential Smoothing 
 
1.  Simple means comparison. 
 
rm  AR_A AR_BC
pre orm Mean 2.9153 14.4607
N 15 15
Std. 
Deviation 
.6153 5.0248
post orm Mean 1.5593 6.1740
N 15 15
Std. 
Deviation 
.4792 3.0161
Total Mean 2.2373 10.3173
N 30 30
Std. 
Deviation 
.8770 5.8600
Class A decreased. 
Class B/C decreased. 
 
2. ANOVA. 
 
 Sum of 
Squares
df Mean 
Square
F Sig.
AR_A Between 
Groups 
13.791 1 13.791 45.346 .000
Within 
Groups 
8.515 28 .304
Total 22.306 29
AR_BC Between 
Groups 
515.016 1 515.016 29.990 .000
Within 
Groups 
480.836 28 17.173
Total 995.853 29
Class A significance less than 0.05, so reject—means are not equal. 
Class BC significance less than 0.05, so reject—means are not equal. 
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Appendix P.  Army Comparison of Means, Exponential Smoothing, continued 
 
3. Independent T-Test 
 
Levene's Test
for Equality of 
Variances
t-test for Equality of Means 
 
F Sig. t df Sig. (2-
tailed)
Mean 
Differen
ce
Std. Error 
Difference
95% Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference
Lower Upper
AR_A Equal 
variances 
assumed
1.252 .273 6.734 28 .000 1.3560 .2014 .9435 1.7685
Equal 
variances not 
assumed
6.734 26.415 .000 1.3560 .2014 .9424 1.7696
AR_B
C
Equal 
variances 
assumed
4.536 .042 5.476 28 .000 8.2867 1.5132 5.1871 11.3863
Equal 
variances not 
assumed
5.476 22.929 .000 8.2867 1.5132 5.1559 11.4174
Class A significance less than 0.025, so reject null hypothesis—means are not equal. 
Class B/C significance less than 0.025, so reject null hypothesis—means are not equal. 
 
4.  Mann-Whitney 
 
AR_A AR_BC
Mann-Whitney U 1.000 25.000
Wilcoxon W 121.000 145.000
Z -4.625 -3.630
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000
Exact Sig. [2*(1-tailed Sig.)] .000 .000
Class A significance less than 0.025, so reject null hypothesis—means are not equal. 
Class B/C significance less than 0.025, so reject null hypothesis—means are not equal. 
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Appendix Q.  AF Comparison of Variance 
 
Class A  Class B-C 
FY Rate Residuals  FY Rate  Residuals 
1983 1.73 0.04457  1983 0.5 0.65643 
1984 1.77 0.10872  1984 0.64 0.66912 
1985 1.49 -0.14713  1985 0.72 0.62181 
1986 1.79 0.17702  1986 0.46 0.2345 
1987 1.51 -0.07883  1987 0.6 0.2472 
1988 1.64 0.07532  1988 0.72 0.23989 
1989 1.59 0.04947  1989 0.12 -0.48742 
1990 1.49 -0.02638  1990 0.39 -0.34473 
1991 1.11 -0.38223  1991 0.43 -0.43204 
1992 1.69 0.22192  1992 0.39 -0.59935 
1993 1.35 -0.09392  1993 0.59 -0.52665 
1994 1.46 0.04023  1994 0.71 -0.53396 
1995 1.44 0.04438  1995 0.86 -0.51127 
       
1996 1.24 -0.13147  1996 0.51 -0.98858 
1997 1.37 0.02268  1997 0.71 -0.91589 
1998 1.14 -0.18317  1998 0.43 -1.3232 
1999 1.55 0.25098  1999 1.22 -0.6605 
2000 1.08 -0.19487  2000 4.08 2.07219 
2001 1.16 -0.09072  2001 3.68 1.54488 
2002 1.52 0.29343  2002 3.3 1.03757 
       
 s^2_pre 0.024124   s^2_pre 0.259991 
 n_pre 14   n_pre 14 
 df_pre 13   df_pre 13 
       
 s^2_post 0.041082   s^2_post 2.053957 
 n_post 7   n_post 7 
 df_post 6   df_post 6 
       
 F-stat 1.702905   F-stat 7.900109 
 F-crit 2.92   F-crit 2.92 
       
 variances are equal   variances are not equal 
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Appendix R.  Army Comparison of Variance 
 
Class A  Class B-C 
FY Rate Residuals  FY Rate  Residuals 
1973 4.09 0.65301  1973 18.02 1.77555 
1974 3.24 -0.11552  1974 16.85 1.0091 
1975 3.52 0.24595  1975 16.65 1.21265 
1976 3.24 0.04742  1976 19.41 4.37619 
1977 3 -0.11111  1977 18.81 4.17974 
1978 3.1 0.07036  1978 16.76 2.53329 
1979 2.7 -0.24817  1979 16.07 2.24684 
1980 2.34 -0.5267  1980 19.25 5.83039 
1981 2.63 -0.15523  1981 19.11 6.09394 
1982 3.29 0.58625  1982 11.14 -1.47252 
1983 2.33 -0.29228  1983 8.05 -4.15897 
1984 2.53 -0.01081  1984 5.65 -6.15542 
1985 2.94 0.48066  1985 5.61 -5.79187 
1986 1.97 -0.40787  1986 5.9 -5.09832 
       
1987 2.17 -0.1264  1987 4.93 -5.66477 
1988 1.84 -0.37493  1988 2.76 -7.43123 
1989 1.9 -0.23346  1989 5.28 -4.50768 
1990 1.83 -0.22199  1990 4.67 -4.71413 
1991 3.69 1.71948  1991 8.31 -0.67058 
1992 1.57 -0.31905  1992 6.29 -2.28703 
1993 1.77 -0.03758  1993 7.93 -0.24348 
1994 1.64 -0.08611  1994 7.43 -0.33994 
1995 0.83 -0.81464  1995 7.06 -0.30639 
1996 0.74 -0.82317  1996 7.49 0.52716 
1997 1.26 -0.2217  1997 7.35 0.79071 
1998 1.34 -0.06023  1998 8.24 2.08426 
1999 1.97 0.65124  1999 11.6 5.84781 
2000 0.62 -0.61729  2000 7.54 2.19135 
2001 1.02 -0.13581  2001 8.87 3.9249 
2002 2.56 1.48566  2002 8.76 4.21845 
       
       
 s^2_pre 0.131246   s^2_pre 18.35831 
 n_pre 14   n_pre 14 
 df_pre 13   df_pre 13 
       
 s^2_post 0.516631   s^2_post 14.03625 
 n_post 16   n_post 16 
 df_post 15   df_post 15 
       
 F-stat 3.936   F-stat 0.765 
 F-crit 2.530   F-crit 2.480 
 variances are not equal   variances are equal 
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Appendix S.  Human Factors Proportions Test Results 
 
AF Class A 
sum[(f-e)^2]/2 2787.57   Number Increased 6 
df 15   Number Decreased 6 
crit 32.80   Number Unchanged 4 
Reject Null Hypothesis 
     
AF Class A--Test Two 
sum[(f-e)^2]/2 110.16   Number Increased 4 
df 10   Number Decreased 6 
crit 18.31   Number Unchanged 1 
Reject Null Hypothesis 
     
AF Class B 
sum[(f-e)^2]/2 379.41   Number Increased 5 
df 15   Number Decreased 8 
crit 32.80   Number Unchanged 3 
Reject Null Hypothesis 
     
Army Class A 
sum[(f-e)^2]/2 111.46   Number Increased 5 
df 12   Number Decreased 4 
crit 28.29   Number Unchanged 4 
Reject Null Hypothesis 
     
Army Class B 
sum[(f-e)^2]/2 372.29   Number Increased 13 
df 12   Number Decreased 0 
crit 28.29   Number Unchanged 0 
Reject Null Hypothesis 
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